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DEATH, DESUETUDE, AND ORIGINAL MEANING
JOHN F. STINNEFORD*
“[I]n nothing is the gradual change of the common law more
apparent, and in nothing does it accommodate itself more to the
change of manners and effect of education, than in the silent and
gradual disuse of barbarous criminal punishments.”1
“The [Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause] ... may be therefore
progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane
justice.” 2
ABSTRACT
One of the most common objections to originalism is that it cannot
cope with cultural change. One of the most commonly invoked
examples of this claimed weakness is the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, whose original meaning would (it is argued)
authorize barbaric punishment practices like flogging and branding,
and disproportionate punishments like the death penalty for
relatively minor offenses. This Article shows that this objection to
originalism is inapt, at least with respect to the Cruel and Unusual
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1. James v. Commonwealth, 12 Serg. & Rawle 220, 228 (Pa. 1825).
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Punishments Clause. As I have shown in prior articles, the original
meaning of “cruel and unusual” is “cruel and contrary to long usage,”
or “cruel and new.” The primary purpose of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause is to prevent legislatures and courts from
imposing new punishments that are unduly harsh in light of the long
usage of the common law. This Article demonstrates that the Clause
also incorporates the common law doctrine of desuetude, which holds
that a once traditional punishment can become “unusual” if it falls
out of usage long enough to show a stable multigenerational
consensus against it. State courts and the Supreme Court of the
United States employed this doctrine in decisions prior to 1958 to
determine whether punishments such as ducking of a common scold,
execution accompanied by torture, and imprisonment at hard labor
for a minor offense were cruel and unusual. Under the original
meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the death
penalty could become unconstitutional if it fell out of usage long
enough to show a stable, multigenerational consensus against it.
This process already occurred with respect to flogging, branding, and
execution for relatively minor crimes like theft, and under the
constitutions of states that abolished the death penalty several
generations ago.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the primary objections to originalist constitutional
interpretation is that this approach renders the Constitution obso-
lete and inflexible, incapable of dealing with societal change over
time.3 The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is one of the
most-cited examples of originalism’s claimed unworkability, thanks
in part to the extremely narrow “originalist” reading Justice Scalia
and others have given the Clause.4 This Article serves as a chal-
lenge both to Justice Scalia’s reading of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause and to the anti-originalist objections to which
it has given rise.
To frame the issue, this Article asks whether the death penalty
could ever become unconstitutional, consistent with the original
meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. The
current debate boils down to two positions: Justice Scalia’s claim
that the death penalty could not be declared unconstitutional
because the Eighth Amendment was meant to embody the moral
perceptions of the late eighteenth century, a time when society
widely accepted the death penalty;5 and the “living originalist” claim
3. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 438 (1986) (“[T]he genius of the Constitution rests not in
any static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability
of its great principles to cope with current problems and current needs. What the
constitutional fundamentals meant to the wisdom of other times cannot be the measure to the
vision of our time.”); Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49
OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 1095 (1989) (“Probably the most prevalent argument against originalism
is that it is too static, and thereby disregards the need to keep the Constitution up to date
with changing times.”); Stephen R. Munzer & James W. Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean
What it Always Meant?, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1032 (1977) (arguing that originalist
interpretation would lead to a Constitution that is “rigid and out-of-date”); Jed Rubenfeld, The
Moment and the Millennium, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1085, 1105 (1998) (questioning the
legitimacy of constitutional interpretation focusing on original meaning on the ground that
such methodology “lacks any account of its own legitimate authority, its own supremacy over
the popular will of the present moment”). But see, e.g., Lee J. Strang, Originalism and
Legitimacy, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 657, 666 (2002) (“[T]he claim that in a changing society
originalism is too static ignores the reality that the values advocated by nonoriginalists are
often themselves not supported by society, but only by the courts.”).
4. See infra Part I.A.
5. See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 94-95 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that
the constitutionality of the death penalty is “evident both from the ubiquity of the death
penalty in the founding era and from the Constitution’s express provision for capital
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(articulated by scholars such as Ronald Dworkin, Jack Balkin, and
Michael Perry) that the death penalty could be declared unconstitu-
tional because the Eighth Amendment embodies an abstract moral
prohibition of cruelty, and it is up to each generation to decide for
itself which practices violate that principle.6 This debate is part of
a larger debate about whether the Constitution is meant to embody
natural principles of justice, and if so, how those principles can be
applied in a way that is stable and reliable, but also sensitive to
cultural change.7
This Article will argue that the word “unusual” resolves the death
penalty debate. As I have shown in previous articles, the word
“unusual” in the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause means
“contrary to long usage.”8 At the time the Eighth Amendment was
adopted, the common law was regarded as the law of “custom and
long usage.”9 If a given practice was “used” over a long period of
time, this was powerful evidence that it comported with principles
of justice and that it enjoyed the consent of the people. A new prac-
tice enjoyed no such presumption. When the state tried to introduce
punishment”) (internal citations omitted); Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION 129, 145 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (arguing that the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment is “rooted in the moral perceptions of the time” when it was adopted—that is, the
late eighteenth century).
6. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 80-83 (Cambridge University Press 2013); Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and
Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 (2007) [hereinafter Balkin, Abortion and
Original Meaning]; Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24
CONST. COMMENT. 427 (2007) [hereinafter Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional
Redemption]; Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 5, at
115, 120.
7. See infra Part II.A-B. Christopher Green has advocated an approach to original
meaning that lies somewhere between Justice Scalia and the “living originalists.” Using the
sense-reference distinction from the philosophy of language, Green argues that the original
“sense” or meaning of constitutional terms should be binding, but that such terms’ original
“reference”—that is, the objects the Framers would have considered to come within the
application of such terms—should be accorded a lesser degree of deference. See Christopher
R. Green, Originalism and the Sense-Reference Distinction, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 555 (2006).
Thus the scope of the Constitution’s application could change over time, even though the
meaning of its terms does not.
8. John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899, 907 (2011) [hereinafter Stinneford, Rethinking
Proportionality]; John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth
Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1764 (2008) [hereinafter
Stinneford, The Original Meaning of Unusual]. 
9. See infra Part II.A.
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a new punishment practice, the new practice was judged against the
traditional practices it replaced. If a new punishment practice was
too harsh in light of the preceding tradition, it would be judged
“unusual” because it was new, and “cruel” because it was harsher
than the tradition would permit.10
This Article contributes further to our understanding of the
original meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause by
demonstrating that it incorporates the doctrine of “desuetude.”11
Desuetude is the idea that a legally authorized practice loses its
authority when it falls out of usage long enough that a “negative
custom” of non-usage has replaced it.12 Like long usage, long non-
usage was thought to have great normative significance, for it tend-
ed to show that the practice had either become obsolete or that it
was never truly reasonable in the first place.13 This is not to say that
there was no controversy concerning desuetude in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries. Proponents of the absolute sovereignty of
parliament argued that neither a positive custom, such as a common
law right, nor a negative custom (desuetude) could invalidate a
statute because statutes represent sovereign will.14 Nonetheless, it
was recognized that a showing of contrary custom could negate
statutes that were declaratory of the common law.15 Because a
declaratory statute did not purport to represent the will of the
sovereign, but the actual practice of the common law, a showing that
a statute misrepresented the custom would negate the statute.16
The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause makes statutes
authorizing punishment for crime analogous to statutes that are de-
claratory of the common law.17 Although punishment statutes do not
purport to “declare” custom, they are explicitly bound to custom by
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. If they are harsher
than custom (positive or negative) will permit, they are cruel and
10. See infra Part III.A.
11. See infra Part II.B.
12. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
13. See infra Part II.B.1.
14. See infra Part II.B.3.
15. See infra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
16. See infra Part II.B.3.
17. See infra Part II.C.
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unusual.18 Thus, for example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court de-
clared in 1825 that the once traditional practice of subjecting a
woman convicted of being a “common scold” to ducking in cold water
had become unusual, and therefore illegal, because it had fallen out
of usage at around the same time the practice of burning witches at
the stake had fallen into disrepute a century before.19 Prior to 1958,
the United States Supreme Court’s decisions concerning the scope
of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause also relied on desue-
tude to determine which punishments were actually cruel and
unusual.20
The original meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause shows that the Eighth Amendment was not meant to
embody the particular moral perceptions of 1790, nor to allow each
generation to decide for itself what morality requires. The moral
perception of any one moment in time is not a reliable basis for
constitutional doctrine because at any given moment the people may
be caught in a moral panic and unduly prone to cruelty.21 The
common law idea of long usage avoids this problem by focusing on
multigenerational moral consensus. If a once traditional punish-
ment falls out of usage long enough to show a stable, multigen-
erational consensus against it, this punishment may appropriately
be called cruel and unusual.22 This insight explains, for example,
Justice Scalia’s declaration that he would have to strike down as
unconstitutional any attempt to revive eighteenth century punish-
ment practices such as branding or flogging, despite the fact that
they were considered acceptable in 1790.23 Such practices have
18. See infra Part III.A.
19. See James v. Commonwealth, 12 Serg. & Rawle 220, 230 (Pa. 1825); see also infra Part
II.C.1 (providing a more complete discussion of James v. Commonwealth).
20. See infra Part II.C.
21. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV.
799, 807 (2003) (describing moral panic as a situation in which “media, politicians, and the
public reinforce each other in an escalating pattern of alarmed reaction to a perceived social
threat”); Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 8, at 907 (arguing that the core
purpose of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is “to protect criminal offenders when
the government’s desire to inflict pain has become temporarily and unjustly enflamed,
whether this desire is caused by political or racial animus or moral panic in the face of a
perceived crisis”); see also infra notes 118-25 and accompanying text.
22. See infra note 280 and accompanying text.
23. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989)
(“I cannot imagine myself, any more than any other federal judge, upholding a statute that
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fallen out of usage long enough that there is now a custom of non-
usage or desuetude. If revived, they would now be “unusual” and
almost certainly cruel.
All of this implies that the death penalty could be declared
unconstitutional consistent with the original meaning of the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause if it were to fall out of usage long
enough that a “tradition” or “custom” of desuetude developed
against it. Such non-usage would have to last several generations to
be considered a reliable measure of constitutionality. We have not
reached that point at the national level, but it may already be the
case that the death penalty is cruel and unusual under the constitu-
tions of states that abolished it several generations ago.24
Part I of this Article sets forth the current debate concerning the
death penalty and original meaning. It examines what Justice
Scalia and the living originalists respectively claim to be the
original meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,
what evidence supports the correctness of either reading, what
standards of adjudication each reading implies, and what benefits
and detriments each reading offers. Part II introduces the concept
of desuetude, demonstrates that it is part of the original meaning of
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, and shows how it
furthers the constitutional norms underlying the Clause in a
manner that is stable and judicially manageable, but also sensitive
to cultural change. Part III discusses the implications of desuetude
for the Supreme Court’s current Eighth Amendment jurisprudence,
particularly as it concerns the death penalty. This Part also
discusses how desuetude may affect the constitutionality of the
death penalty under state constitutions in those states that
abolished the death penalty several generations ago.
I. THE DEATH PENALTY DEBATE
A. The Death Penalty and Justice Scalia’s Originalism
Justice Antonin Scalia is the most prominent advocate of the
position that, absent constitutional amendment, the death penalty
imposes the punishment of flogging.”).
24. See infra notes 328-30 and accompanying text.
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can never be declared unconstitutional consistent with the original
meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. This
Subpart sets forth Justice Scalia’s claim, describes the evidence he
uses to support the claim, examines the standards of adjudication
the claim implies, and evaluates the benefits and detriments this
reading of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause offers.
1. The Substance of Justice Scalia’s Claim
In Baze v. Rees, Justice John Paul Stevens announced that he no
longer believed that the death penalty is constitutional.25 In Justice
Stevens’s judgment, the death penalty does not adequately further
core penal goals such as retribution, deterrence, or incapacitation,26
and creates an unacceptable risk that defendants will be executed
based on invidious discrimination27 or a mistaken finding of guilt.28
For these reasons, Justice Stevens concluded that the death penalty
amounted to the “extinction of life with only marginal contributions
to any discernible social or public purposes” and that it was
therefore cruel and unusual.29
Justice Stevens’s opinion in Baze was based on the assumption
that judges, or at least Justices, have the authority to declare the
death penalty unconstitutional despite its long existence within the
American criminal justice system. Justice Scalia wrote a separate
concurrence in Baze for the specific purpose of refuting this
assumption.30 Justice Scalia’s opinion appeared to rest on two semi-
independent arguments. The first argument was explicitly textual-
ist. Justice Scalia noted that the Fifth Amendment refers to the
death penalty twice, granting the right to indictment by grand jury
for “a capital, or otherwise infamous crime” and forbidding the
federal government from denying any person the right to due
process or the privilege against double jeopardy in cases involving
a potential deprivation of “life.”31 Because the death penalty is
25. See 553 U.S. 35, 86 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 78-81.
27. Id. at 85.
28. Id. at 84-86.
29. Id. at 86 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972) (White, J., concurring)).
30. Id. at 87 (Scalia, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 87-88.
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“explicitly sanctioned”32 by “the very text”33 of the Constitution, this
penalty must be “a permissible legislative choice.”34
Justice Scalia’s second argument focused less on the text of the
Fifth Amendment and more on what Justice Scalia took to be the
original public meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause. The phrase “Cruel and Unusual Punishments” may not be
read to prohibit the death penalty, Justice Scalia argued, because
there is no evidence that Americans in the late eighteenth century
read it this way. The First Congress—“[t]he same Congress that
proposed the Eighth Amendment”—also enacted a criminal statute
that imposed the death penalty for several offenses.35 The same
Congress also proposed the Fifth Amendment, which makes
reference to “capital” crimes and requires the federal government to
provide due process before depriving defendants of “life.”36 These
facts indicate that the generation that adopted the Eighth Amend-
ment did not read the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to
forbid the death penalty. If this is so, Justice Scalia argued, we may
not conclude that this punishment violates the Eighth Amendment
today.
Justice Scalia’s use of the phrase “explicitly sanction[s]”37 is, at
best, misleading. The Fifth Amendment does not say, “The Congress
shall have power to authorize imposition of the death penalty.” It
says that anyone the federal government charges with a serious
crime, including a capital offense, has the right to indictment by
grand jury and against double jeopardy, and that anyone the federal
government deprives of a serious personal interest (life, liberty or,
property) has the right to due process.38 These provisions obviously
assume the existence of capital punishment, and one could argue,
as Justice Scalia does, that they are evidence that the founding
generation did not consider the death penalty to be “cruel and
32. Id. at 88.
33. Id. at 87.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 88.
36. Id. at 87-88.
37. Id.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; ... nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”).
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unusual.”39 But at no point do they or any other part of the constitu-
tional text “explicitly sanction” the death penalty.
Justice Scalia’s original public meaning argument, on the other
hand, raises some very important questions. Does the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments refer
to the standards of cruelty that prevailed in 1791, when the
amendment was adopted? To current standards of cruelty? To a
“real” moral standard that is somehow distinct from the societal
norms of a given place and time? To something else altogether? 
Justice Scalia appears to believe that the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause is a positive legal norm that forbids only those
punishments that violate the standards of cruelty that prevailed in
1791. As he put it in A Matter of Interpretation, the Clause does not
embody “a moral principle of ‘cruelty’ that philosophers can play
with in the future, but rather the existing society’s assessment of
what is cruel.”40
2. Evidence Supporting the Correctness of Justice Scalia’s            
       Claim
Justice Scalia does not provide direct evidence that his reading of
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is correct, but infers it
from the fact that the Constitution is written law, its authority
derives from the consent of the people, and its purpose is to
entrench constitutional rights and principles.41 The primary con-
trast between the United States Constitution and the English
Constitution from which the prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments originally derived is that the United States Constitu-
tion is a written document,42 formally enacted by the people,43 and
39. Baze, 553 U.S. at 87-88.
40. Scalia, supra note 5, at 145.
41. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of the United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION, supra note 5, at 3, 40-41 (“It certainly cannot be said that a Constitution
naturally suggests changeability; to the contrary, its whole purpose is to prevent change—to
embed certain rights in such a manner that future generations cannot readily take them
away. A society that adopts a bill of rights is skeptical that ‘evolving standards of decency’
always ‘mark progress,’ and that societies always ‘mature,’ as opposed to rot.”).
42. The fact that the United States Constitution is a written document is often asserted
as one of the strongest arguments for an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation.
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supreme over all other laws.44 Whereas the British Parliament
claimed the right to change the English constitution through
ordinary legislation,45 the United States Constitution cannot be
changed except through a formal amendment process that is
See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 91 (2004) (“Once the
importance of text or ‘writtenness’ is conceded, some version of originalism becomes much
harder to resist.”); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 47 (1999) (“[A]n
originalist interpretive approach is ... required by the very fact that the United States has a
written constitution.”); Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, supra note
6, at 429 (arguing that originalism is entailed by the fact that the Constitution “is a written
constitution, and it is enforceable law”); Lawrence B. Solum, Incorporation and Originalist
Theory, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 409, 413 (2009) (“[C]onstitutional theorists have argued
that the authority of the original meaning is entailed by the fact that the Constitution is
written: the point or purpose of writtenness is to fix and constrain the content of
constitutional doctrine.”); Lee J. Strang, The Challenge of, and Challenges to, Originalism, 29
CONST. COMMENT. 111, 123-24 (2013) (arguing that the Constitution’s writtenness “more than
anything else ... accounts for originalism’s staying power”); cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803) (“The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that
those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written. To what purpose
are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these
limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained?”). But see Andrew B.
Coan, The Irrelevance of Writtenness in Constitutional Interpretation, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1025,
1030 (2010) (“The writtenness of the Constitution is ... irrelevant to the choice between
originalism and other plausible contenders.”).
43. Popular sovereignty is also often invoked as an argument for originalism. If the
authority of the Constitution derives from the people, it is argued, only the people should have
the power to change the meaning of the Constitution, and only through the formal
amendment process prescribed therein. See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 42, at 55-61
(arguing that popular sovereignty, as well as writtenness and the rule of law require that the
Constitution be interpreted according to its original meaning); Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme
Court 1999 Term—Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 34-37
(2000) (defending the text of the Constitution as an expression of popular sovereignty);
Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1127, 1136 (1998) (arguing that judges engaged in constitutional adjudication have “no
democratic warrant” to go “beyond the meaning of the words that were enacted” in order to
enforce the judges’ own ideas of “the needs and goals of society”). But see Thomas B. Colby,
Originalism and the Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1627, 1629
(2013) (arguing that the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment was forced upon the former
Confederate states “at gunpoint” undermines the claim that the democratic legitimacy
depends upon traditional notions of popular sovereignty).
44. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
45. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *156 (describing Parliament as
having “absolute despotic power”); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 259-65 (1969).
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significantly more onerous than the process of enacting ordinary
legislation.46
Justice Scalia argues that we can only honor the Constitution’s
writtenness and its concern for entrenchment and popular sover-
eignty by interpreting its terms to cover essentially the same
referents they would have been read to cover at the time the
Constitution was adopted.47 Justice Scalia’s reasons for this position
are discussed in Part I.A.4, below.
3. Standards of Adjudication Implied by Justice Scalia’s Claim
Justice Scalia’s approach to interpreting the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause creates a relatively bright-line rule.48 If a
punishment was acceptable in 1791, it must be acceptable today. If
it was considered unacceptably cruel in 1791, it must be unaccept-
ably cruel today.49 Justice Scalia further claims that the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause forbids only barbaric methods of
punishment, not punishments that are cruel by virtue of being
disproportionate to the offense.50 Judges may not ask whether a
given punishment would have been considered too harsh for a given
offense in 1791, but only whether the punishment would have been
considered too harsh to impose for any offense.51 As long as the
46. U.S. CONST. art. V (setting forth the process for amending the Constitution).
47. Scalia, supra note 5, at 145 (arguing that the purpose of reducing the prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishments to writing is to preserve “the moral perceptions of the time”
at which it was enacted against “the moral perceptions of a future, more brutal, generation”).
48. Scholars have given various accounts of the distinction between “rules” and
“standards” in constitutional adjudication. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:
An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33
UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L.
REV. 953, 956-57 (1995).
49. See Scalia, supra note 5, at 145.
50. For Justice Scalia’s historical argument supporting the claim that the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause does not prohibit disproportionate punishments, see Harmelin
v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966-85, 991-93 (1991) (Scalia, J.). For a demonstration that Justice
Scalia’s anti-proportionality argument is based upon an incorrect understanding of the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause’s original meaning, see Stinneford, Rethinking Propor-
tionality, supra note 8, at 926-61.
51. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 349 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause only prohibits “always-and-everywhere ‘cruel’
punishments, such as the rack and the thumbscrew”).
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punishment was not completely unknown or absolutely rejected at
the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted, it is not cruel and
unusual today, even if it is applied to a different and much less
serious crime today than in 1791.52
Justice Scalia acknowledges that this approach will not answer
every question. For example, when a legislature imposes a new
form of punishment that was unknown at the time the Constitution
was adopted, courts must engage in an “exercise of judgment” that
is not entirely “cut-and-dried.”53 In such situations, the court must
“follow the trajectory”54 of the constitutional provision in order to
determine whether the punishment would have been considered
unconstitutional had it been known in 1791. But given the rarity of
situations in which the government invents a genuinely new form
of punishment, Justice Scalia’s approach would almost always work
as a “cut-and-dried” bright-line rule.
4. Benefits of Justice Scalia’s Approach
According to Justice Scalia, the main benefit of his approach to
constitutional interpretation is that it protects the constitutional
values of entrenchment and popular sovereignty. Justice Scalia sees
his main interpretive rival as “Living Constitution[alism],” an
approach that treats the Constitution as “a body of law that (unlike
normal statutes) grows and changes from age to age, in order to
meet the needs of a changing society.”55 Justice Scalia rejects living
constitutionalism because, he argues, this approach allows judges
to impose their own subjective preferences on the rest of society.56
Such power is inconsistent with entrenchment57 and popular
sovereignty.58 
To establish his point, Justice Scalia compares living consti-
tutionalism to common law adjudication—a form of judging that is,
52. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 936.
53. Scalia, supra note 41, at 45.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 38.
56. See id. at 16-18.
57. See id. at 40-41.
58. See id. at 9.
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Justice Scalia argues, a thinly disguised judicial power grab.59
According to Justice Scalia, the common law was seen prior to the
end of the eighteenth century as “a preexisting body of rules, uni-
form throughout the nation.”60 Common law judges were thought to
discover these rules rather than create them.61 Oliver Wendell
Holmes and the Legal Realists who followed him showed, however,
that this view of the common law was false.62 In reality, “judges ...
‘make’ the common law, and ... each state has its own.”63 Thus the
“attitude of the common-law judge” is one that asks, “What is the
most desirable resolution of this case, and how can any impediments
to the achievement of that result be evaded?”64 This process is
“exhilarating” because it involves “devising, out of the brilliance of
one’s own mind, those laws that ought to govern mankind.”65
Justice Scalia argues that living constitutionalism permits judges
to treat the Constitution like the common law, despite the fact that
the Constitution is a written document whose meaning is supposed
to be fixed.66 Under living constitutionalism, judges no longer ask
what the Constitution means but focus instead on “what the judges
currently [think] it desirable for it to mean.”67 Living constitutional-
ism is “the common law returned, but infinitely more powerful than
what the old common law ever pretended to be, for now it trumps
even the statutes of democratic legislatures.”68 Such power is
inconsistent with popular sovereignty because it enables unelected
judges to overrule the will of the people based on nothing more than
59. See id. at 29.
60. Id. at 10.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 35-36 (Boston, Little,
Brown, & Co. 1881); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
11-15 (1960); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 820-21 (1935); cf. L. L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV.
429, 435-38 (1934). For an important critique of Oliver Wendell Holmes’s impact on twentieth
century law, see generally ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK,
AND LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES (2000).
63. Scalia, supra note 41, at 10.
64. Id. at 13.
65. Id. at 7.
66. Id. at 38.
67. Scalia, supra note 23, at 852.
68. Scalia, supra note 41, at 38.
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the judges’ own subjective preferences.69 Furthermore, although a
living constitutionalist approach might permit judges to expand the
scope of constitutional protections—for example, by declaring the
death penalty unconstitutional—it would also permit them to
retract constitutional protections to reflect “the moral perceptions
of a future, more brutal, generation.”70 Such power is inconsistent
with the idea of entrenched constitutional rights.71
Justice Scalia argues that only by reading the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause to cover nothing other than the punishments
that would have been considered cruel and unusual in 1791, can we
prevent judges from replacing the will of the people with their own
will, and potentially undermining constitutional rights that are
supposed to be permanent.72
5. Detriments of Justice Scalia’s Approach
Not long after he joined the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia gave
a remarkably candid speech73 in which he acknowledged the key
weakness of his version of originalism: cultural values really do
change over time. An approach to constitutional interpretation that
does not take this into account will sometimes appear woefully
inadequate. Justice Scalia framed the problem this way:
What if some state should enact a new law providing public
lashing, or branding of the right hand, as punishment for
certain criminal offenses? Even if it could be demonstrated
unequivocally that these were not cruel and unusual measures
in 1791, and even though no prior Supreme Court decision has
specifically disapproved them, I doubt whether any federal
judge—even among the many who consider themselves
originalists—would sustain them against an [E]ighth
[A]mendment challenge.... [A]ny espousal of originalism as a
practical theory of exegesis must somehow come to terms with
69. See id. at 9 (observing sarcastically that the common law method of adjudication
“would be an unqualified good, were it not for a trend in government that has developed in
recent centuries, called democracy”).
70. See Scalia, supra note 5.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. Scalia, supra note 23.
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that reality.... I hasten to confess that in a crunch I may prove
a faint-hearted originalist. I cannot imagine myself, any more
than any other federal judge, upholding a statute that imposes
the punishment of flogging.74
This passage highlights several weaknesses of Justice Scalia’s
version of originalism. First, this approach tends strongly toward
the antiquarian, treating the Constitution as an eighteenth century
relic that asks judges to apply standards that no one—including a
strongly committed originalist like Justice Scalia—is willing to
apply today.75 This antiquarianism leads Justice Scalia to abandon
his interpretive principles in situations when the cognitive disso-
nance between eighteenth and twenty-first century values seems too
great—for example, when a legislature tries to bring back an
eighteenth-century punishment, such as flogging or branding.
Justice Scalia’s pragmatic willingness to abandon principles in
certain cases creates the risk that he will, as Jack Balkin put it,
“pick and choose” when to employ or not employ his originalist
methodology.76 This freedom creates the further risk that Justice
Scalia’s version of originalism will end up “track[ing] particular
political agendas and allow[ing] judges to impose their political
ideology on the law—the very thing that the methodology purports
to avoid.”77 In other words, Justice Scalia’s version of originalism
recreates the very threat to entrenchment and popular sovereignty
that it purports to avoid.78
74. Id. at 861, 864. Recently, Justice Scalia indicated that he has changed his views
regarding the constitutionality of flogging. See MARCIA COYLE, THE ROBERTS COURT: THE
STRUGGLE FOR THE CONSTITUTION 165 (2013);  Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Justice
Scalia, N.Y. MAG., Oct. 14, 2013, at 24 (“[W]hat I would say now is, yes, if a state enacted a
law permitting flogging, it is immensely stupid, but it is not unconstitutional.”).
75. Of course, the Constitution does not guarantee outcomes that always appear morally
attractive by today’s standards. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56
N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981). But an approach to constitutional interpretation that completely
forecloses any capacity to take cultural change into account would make the Constitution
unworkable or obsolete, as Justice Scalia’s struggle with flogging and branding demonstrates.
76. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, supra note 6, at 298.
77. Id. at 299.
78. Originalist scholar Randy Barnett has made a similar critique of Justice Scalia’s
approach to constitutional interpetation. See Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique
of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 13 (2006) (“Justice Scalia is simply not
an originalist [because Justice Scalia’s approach to constitutional jurisprudence gives him]
three different routes by which to escape adhering to the original meaning of the text. These
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B. The Death Penalty and “Living Originalism”
Justice Scalia’s arguments have drawn forth a competing
originalist account of constitutional interpretation, sometimes called
“semantic originalism,”79 or “text and principle” originalism,80 or
“living originalism.”81 Scholars such as Ronald Dworkin, Jack
Balkin, and Michael Perry argue that the death penalty can be
declared unconstitutional consistent with the original meaning of
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, viewed from a living
originalist perspective.82 This Subpart summarizes the living
originalist claim, describes the evidence used to support the claim,
examines the standards of adjudication this claim implies, and
evaluates the benefits and detriments this reading of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause seems to offer.
1. The Substance of the Living Originalist Claim
The key claim of living originalism is that we should be bound by
the original meaning of the constitutional text but not necessarily
by its “original expected application.”83 As Ronald Dworkin put it,
the “rights-granting clauses [should] be read to say what those who
made them intended to say,” but they need not “be understood to
have the consequences that those who made them expected them to
have.”84 Instead, such clauses should be applied in accordance with
contemporary values and expectations.85
are more than enough to allow him, or any judge, to reach any result he wishes.”).
79. Dworkin, supra note 6, at 119 (internal quotation marks omitted).
80. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, supra note 6, at 293.
81. See generally JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011).
82. See Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, supra note 6, at 348 & n.151; Balkin,
Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, supra note 6, at 432-33; Dworkin, supra
note 6, at 120; Perry, supra note 6, at 79-83.
83. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, supra note 6, at 293; see also Dworkin, supra
note 6, at 117 (“[T]extualism insists on deference to one kind of intention—semantic
intention.”); id. at 119 (distinguishing “‘semantic’ originalism, which insists that the rights-
granting clauses be read to say what those who made them intended to say” from
“‘expectation’ originalism, which holds that these clauses should be understood to have the
consequences that those who made them expected them to have”).
84. Dworkin, supra note 6, at 119.
85. Dworkin argues that a semantic originalist approach to constitutional interpretation
is superior to Justice Scalia’s because it focuses the inquiry on the moral principle embedded
in the Constitution rather than a “concrete and dated” rule. See id. at 120. Balkin makes a
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Under this account, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
does not forbid those punishments that the enactors and early
readers of the Bill of Rights considered unacceptably cruel, but
“whatever punishments are in fact cruel and unusual,”86 regardless
of what the Framers thought of them. This approach to constitu-
tional interpretation appears to be based on an implicit natural law
conception:87 some punishments “are in fact”88 cruel and unusual
and some are not. Living originalists argue that because eighteenth
century Americans did not occupy a privileged ground from which
to discern what natural law requires, we are free to revisit the
natural law concepts built into the Constitution and apply them in
light of our own experiences and understandings. If we think the
death penalty is “in fact” cruel and unusual, we are free to declare
it unconstitutional.89
similar point, arguing that a living originalist approach to constitutional interpretation allows
“each generation of Americans [to] seek to persuade each other about how the text and its
underlying principles should apply to their circumstances, their problems, and their
grievances.” Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, supra note 6, at 301. Balkin claims that
this approach allows “[e]ach generation [to] make[ ] the Constitution their Constitution by
calling upon its text and its principles and arguing about what they mean in their own time.”
Id. at 302.
86. Dworkin, supra note 6, at 120.
87. By “natural law conception,” I mean the idea that there is an objectively real moral
order, discernible by reason and capable of serving as a measure for the critique of positive
law. See, e.g., Harold J. Berman, The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale,
103 YALE L.J. 1651, 1653 (1994) (“Natural law theory treats law essentially as the
embodiment in rules and concepts of moral principles that are derived ultimately from reason
and conscience.”); see also 2 ST.THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, pt. II-I, q. 90, art. 1,
reprinted in 20 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 205 (Robert M. Hutchins ed., Fathers
of the English Dominican Province trans., 1952) (“Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby
man is induced to act or is restrained from acting: for lex (law) is derived from ligare (to bind),
because it obliges (obligare) one to act. Now the rule and measure of human acts is the reason,
which is the first principle of human acts.”); ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, bk. III, reprinted in 9
GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD: THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 445, 485 (Robert M.
Hutchins ed., Benjamin Jowett trans., 1952) (“The law is reason unaffected by desire.”);
CICERO, ON THE LAWS, bk. I, § 28 reprinted in 1 ON THE COMMONWEALTH AND ON THE LAWS
105, 115 (James E. G. Zetzel ed., 1999) (“[W]e are born for justice and ... justice is established
not by opinion but by nature.”).
88. Dworkin, supra note 6, at 120.
89. Id.; see also Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, supra note 6, at 295 (“[T]he
Eighth Amendment’s prohibitions on ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ bans punishments that
are cruel and unusual as judged by contemporary application of these concepts (and
underlying principles), not by how people living in 1791 would have applied those concepts
and principles.”).
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2. Evidence Supporting the Correctness of the Living Originalist 
       Claim
Living originalists rely primarily on the fact that the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause uses abstract moral language.90 Some
parts of the Constitution are written as concrete, determinate rules.
Clause 4 of Article II, Section 1, for example, requires that the
President be at least thirty-five years old.91 Clause 1 of Article I,
Section 3 requires that the United States Senate be composed of two
Senators from every state.92 By contrast, the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause contains an abstract moral prohibition: don’t
be cruel.93 Living originalists argue that this use of abstract moral
language is important because it signals that the best way to be
faithful to the original meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause is to engage in abstract moral reasoning.94 If the
enactors of the Bill of Rights intended to prohibit only those
punishments considered cruel in 1791, they could have simply made
a list of prohibited punishments. The fact that they did not do so,
but instead used abstract moral language, indicates that the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause was not meant to be limited by
the particular expectations of 1791.95
3. Standards of Adjudication Implied by the Living Originalist   
       Claim
How to use abstract moral reasoning to decide cases under the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is unclear. Ronald Dworkin
90. See Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, supra note 6, at 304 (“We look to
underlying principles because when the text uses relatively abstract and general concepts, we
must know which principles the text presumes or is attempting to embrace.”); Dworkin, supra
note 6, at 120 (arguing that the Framers “intended to lay down an abstract principle
forbidding whatever punishments are in fact cruel and unusual”). 
91. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4.
92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
93. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
94. See, e.g., Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, supra note 6, at 304-05; Dworkin,
supra note 6, at 120, 122-23.
95. Dworkin and Balkin have been criticized for assuming that constitutional provisions
have “abstract meaning” without adequately exploring the possibility that their true meaning
is concrete. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Abstract Meaning Fallacy,
2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 737 (2012).
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argues that judges should be free to use their own moral judgment
“to construct, reinspect, and revise, generation by generation, the
skeleton of freedom and equality of concern that its great clauses,
in their majestic abstraction, command.”96 Jack Balkin argues that
judicial interpretation of the Constitution should be “parasitic”97 on
interpretation by citizens, and that social and political movements
should be the main driver of changes to constitutional doctrine.98
Michael Perry asserts that the Supreme Court of the United States
should look to international human rights law and determine that
the death penalty is cruel and unusual because there is an emerging
international consensus against it.99 The Court itself uses a mix of
these approaches, sometimes relying primarily on its own “inde-
pendent judgment”100 to decide cases,101 sometimes attempting to
96. See Dworkin, supra note 6, at 123 (quoting RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION 145
(1993)).
97. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, supra note 6, at 308.
98. See id. at 308-09.
99. See Michael J. Perry, Is Capital Punishment Unconstitutional? And Even If We Think
It Is, Should We Want the Supreme Court to So Rule?, 41 GA. L. REV. 867, 896-97 & nn.80-83
(2007) [hereinafter Perry, Is Capital Punishment Unconstitutional?]. Professor Perry’s claim
is predicated upon two factual assertions concerning the meaning of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause. First, Professor Perry takes the position that “unusual” means “rare”
rather than “contrary to long usage.” See id. Second, Professor Perry claims that a “true global
morality” has emerged since the end of World War II, a morality he calls “the morality of
human rights.” See Michael J. Perry, Adjudicating Rights-Based Constitutional Claims: The
Morality of Human Rights and the Power of Judicial Review 2 (Emory Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 14-271), available at http://perma.cc/4YR3-48JN. Perry argues that this “global
morality” provides the substantive content of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.
Thus, he asserts, courts should ask whether the death penalty is sufficiently rare in countries
that recognize the “morality of human rights” that we can say it violates the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause. See id. at 23-24; MICHAEL J. PERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 6, 80-83.
100. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005).
101. For example, in Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court declared mandatory life
sentences with no possibility of parole unconstitutional as applied to juvenile homicide
offenders. 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2457-58 (2012). In reaching this decision, the Court made no effort
to show that its holding comported with either the original meaning of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause or any current societal consensus. The Court argued instead that its
holding was justified because it flowed “straightforwardly” from the Court’s own prior Eighth
Amendment precedents, and because it accorded with the Court’s own beliefs concerning the
proper justifications for punishment. Id. at 2464-66, 2471. Similarly, in Graham v. Florida,
560 U.S. 48, 48-49 (2010), Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 407-09 (2008), and Roper, 543
U.S. at 551, 562, the Supreme Court invalidated punishment practices that were authorized
in a large number of states or showed a strong trend toward general approval. Although the
Court claimed to find a societal consensus against the punishment practice in each case, these
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discern whether there is a “societal consensus” against a given
punishment,102 and sometimes looking to international practice and
opinion to supplement its reasoning.103 To date, the Court has not
established a stable relationship between these various modes of
reasoning, nor has it discerned a principle for determining which
mode of reasoning should prevail in the event they conflict with
each other in a given case.
4. Benefits of the Living Originalist Approach
The primary benefit claimed for living originalism is that it
avoids the antiquarian tendencies of Justice Scalia’s approach to
constitutional interpretation. As noted above, cultural norms really
do change over time. An approach to constitutional interpretation
that does not take this into account forces its adherents either to
claims were not plausible. See Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 8, at 921-23.
102. The Supreme Court’s effort to determine whether there is a current societal consensus
against a given punishment derives from the plurality opinion in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
101 (1958), which held that the meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause must
be determined in accordance with the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society.” Between 1958 and 2012, when Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2455, was decided,
the Supreme Court never declared a criminal sentence cruel and unusual without at least
pretending to find a societal consensus against it, except in cases involving the procedures for
imposing a death sentence. See, e.g., Graham, 560 U.S. at 48-49; Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 407-08;
Roper, 543 U.S. at 551-52; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S.
277 (1983); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977);
cf., e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 280-82 (1976) (invalidating mandatory
death penalty statutes because they did not provide adequate discretion to jurors in death
penalty cases). As noted above, the Supreme Court’s claims about societal consensus have
become increasingly implausible in recent years. See supra note 101. The evolving standards
of decency test has been criticized for a variety of reasons, including the fact that this test, if
followed faithfully, would have the perverse effect of making the rights of an unpopular
minority group dependent on majority public opinion. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST 69 (1980); Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword, The Vanishing Constitution, 103
HARV. L. REV. 43, 88 n.200 (1989); Tonja Jacobi, The Subtle Unraveling of Federalism: The
Illogic of Using State Legislation as Evidence of an Evolving National Consensus, 84 N.C. L.
REV. 1089, 1113 (2006); Michael S. Moore, Morality in Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 31
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 47, 63 (2008); Stinneford, The Original Meaning of Unusual, supra
note 8, at 1753-55; David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission of Judicial Review, 76 U. CHI.
L. REV. 859, 868 (2009).
103. See, e.g., Graham, 560 U.S. at 80-81; Roper, 543 U.S. at 575-80. The Supreme Court’s
references to international opinion and practice in its Eighth Amendment decisions have been
controversial and have drawn significant scholarly commentary. See, e.g., Youngjae Lee,
International Consensus as Persuasive Authority in the Eighth Amendment, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
63, 63-64 (2007).
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take morally unattractive positions—for example, that it would be
constitutional for a legislature to revive flogging as a form of
punishment104—or to abandon their own principles to avoid such a
result.105 By contrast, living originalism allows the Supreme Court
to take social change into account when it formulates constitutional
doctrine. For example, Jack Balkin argues that decisions to outlaw
racial segregation and to uphold the New Deal are hard to justify
from the perspective of Scalia-type originalism, but are “supremely
easy” to justify under a living originalist approach to constitutional
interpretation.106 Such decisions rested on changes to the political
and social culture that allowed them to become accepted and stable
parts of constitutional doctrine.107
A further advantage claimed for living originalism is that it
allows the Supreme Court to drive social change, not merely take
account of it.108 When Brown v. Board of Education was decided, the
idea of desegregation was still very controversial.109 By giving
desegregation constitutional stature, the Supreme Court arguably
helped change the culture by delegitimizing claims that legally
enforced racial separation might be an acceptable social policy.110
Living originalists argue that when the Court uses the Constitution
to change the culture, such occasions may appropriately be consid-
ered “achievements”111 rather than “deviations and mistakes.”112
5. Detriments of the Living Originalist Approach
The primary detriment of the living originalist approach to
constitutional interpretation is that it is hard to square with
104. See Scalia, supra note 23.
105. See supra Part I.A.5.
106. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, supra note 6, at 450.
107. See id. at 477 (“Brown, Loving, Craig, and the New Deal decisions became precedents
in the first place because political and social movements demanded change and argued for
different interpretations of the Constitution. Once these precedents were adopted and
established, they served ‘widely held values of stability and continuity.’”).
108. See Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, supra note 6, at 300-02, 307-09 (arguing
that judges can legitimately use constitutional law to help social movements gain political
traction).
109. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
110. See Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, supra note 6, at 300-02, 307-09.
111. Id. at 299.
112. Id. at 300.
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principles of entrenchment, popular sovereignty, and even the rule
of law. It is exceedingly difficult to use abstract moral reasoning to
make reliable decisions in concrete cases—particularly when one
lives, as we do, at the end of a century-long period in which most
legal scholars and judges have rejected natural law thinking.113 How
can the Supreme Court make constitutional decisions about what
morality requires if it is not sure that morality really exists, and if
the grounds for moral judgment are deeply contested in society? If
the Court does make such decisions under these conditions, how is
this anything other than the imposition of the Justices’ own
subjective preferences on the rest of society? How can such imposi-
tions be compatible with the principles of entrenchment, popular
sovereignty, and rule of law that underlie our constitutional order?
As noted in Part I.B.3 above, living originalists have offered a
variety of accounts of the appropriate methodology for adjudicating
moral claims under the Constitution, including unconstrained moral
reasoning by judges,114 reasoning that is “parasitic”115 on the results
of social movements, and reasoning that looks to international
moral consensus.116 But all three approaches suffer from similar,
and ultimately fatal, weaknesses. Ronald Dworkin’s argument for
unconstrained judicial moral reasoning is most obviously problem-
atic, for it gives the Supreme Court the power to overrule the moral
judgment of the politically accountable branches of government in
the name of the Court’s own moral judgment. Moreover, by cloaking
such judgments in the mantle of the Constitution, the Supreme
Court can prevent them from being revisited through the normal
political process. Such power is arguably incompatible with popular
sovereignty because it allows the Justices’ own subjective will to
prevail over the will of the people. The unconstrained power to
“construct, reinspect, and revise”117 constitutional rights is arguably
incompatible with entrenchment because it allows the Court to give
as broad or narrow an interpretation of a given right as it wishes.
113. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, From Blackstone to Holmes: The Revolt Against Natural
Law, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 491, 492-94 (2009).
114. See Dworkin, supra note 6, at 123.
115. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, supra note 6, at 308.
116. See Perry, Is Capital Punishment Unconstitutional?, supra note 99, at 896-97 &
nn.80-83.
117. See Dworkin, supra note 6, at 123 (quoting RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION 145
(1993)).
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If the eighteenth-century enactors of the Bill of Rights did not
occupy a privileged position from which to determine what morality
requires, neither does the current Supreme Court. 
Jack Balkin’s argument that social movements should drive
judicial decisions suffers from a similar set of weaknesses. Social
movements sometimes get the answer wrong, particularly if they
are driven by a moral panic. We approve of the movements to
abolish slavery and end segregation because they have been shown,
over time, to be obviously correct. But other social movements turn
out to be terribly misguided. For example, the movement to steril-
ize “mental defectives” led to the involuntary sterilization of more
than sixty thousand people,118 a result that is generally condemned
today. Regarding criminal punishment, there have been social
movements to abolish the death penalty119 and to reform prisons,120
but also to impose extremely harsh punishments on drug offend-
ers,121 sex offenders,122 juvenile offenders,123 recidivists,124 and
others. Moreover, there are often opposing social movements that
exist at the same time—the pro-choice and pro-life movements, for
example. Which of these social movements get morality right and
which do not? The mere existence of the social movement itself
cannot answer this question. Even if a judge’s decision is
“parasitic”125 on the results of social movements, the judge must still
118. See, e.g., PHILIP R. REILLY, THE SURGICAL SOLUTION 94 (1991) (presenting data as to
involuntary sterilization in the United States between 1907 and 1963); see also DANIEL J.
KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS 47-48 (1985); EDWARD J. LARSON, SEX, RACE, AND SCIENCE
1-2 (1995). The Supreme Court validated the involuntary sterilization movement in Buck v.
Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927), in which Justice Holmes infamously declared, “three
generations of imbeciles is enough.” 
119. See, e.g., John D. Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment, America’s
Death Penalty, and the Abolition Movement, 4 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 195 (2009).
120. See generally THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON (Norval Morris & David J.
Rothman eds., 1995) (discussing the evolution of prisons from the late 1700s to the 1990s).
121. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961 & n.1 (1991).
122. See Michael Vitiello, Punishing Sex Offenders: When Good Intentions Go Bad, 40 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 651, 653-54, 671-72 (2008); see also John F. Stinneford, Incapacitation Through
Maiming: Chemical Castration, the Eighth Amendment, and the Denial of Human Dignity, 3
U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 559, 561-62 (2006).
123. See HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE
OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1999 NATIONAL REPORT 88-89 (1999), available at http://perma.cc/
UV6G-A7NP.
124. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 14-15, 30 (2003).
125. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, supra note 6, at 308.
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decide which movements to rely upon and which to reject. Thus, we
are ultimately led back to Ronald Dworkin’s position that judges
should have unconstrained power to pick winners and losers.126
Michael Perry’s argument about international human rights law
presents the same problems as Jack Balkin’s social movement
argument, but on a global scale. Sometimes the world is enflamed
with good ideas—the movement against the death penalty may be
an example of that.127 But sometimes the world is enflamed with bad
ideas—for example, the pervasive anti-semitism that preceded
World War II.128 Moreover, it is even rarer to find international
consensus around any given moral ideal than it is to find national
consensus. Although many countries have abolished the death
penalty, many continue to impose it.129 The United States itself has
refused to join any international treaties that forbid the death
penalty.130 The only way to find an international consensus against
the death penalty is to limit the countries we are willing to include
in the international community—focusing only, for example, on
“liberal democracies.”131 But such picking and choosing implies the
existence of a moral standard for such choice. Where does the
standard come from? How is it anything other than the imposition
of judicial will? 
The “international consensus” argument is also the least compati-
ble with original meaning. The ratification debates show quite
126. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
127. See generally DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION 3-5 (2010) (noting the rarity of
capital cases that are not marred with doubt).
128. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL ANTI-SEMITISM: A REPORT PROVIDED
TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS (2008), available at http://perma.cc/RBZ2-L2VU.
129. According to Amnesty International, fifty-eight countries currently authorize use of
the death penalty and ninety-eight do not. See Figures On The Death Penalty, AMNESTY INT’L,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/death-penalty/numbers [http://perma.cc/RGP9-ETQH] (last visited
July 6, 2014); see also PERRY, supra note 6, at 71 (noting that about half the countries in the
world are parties to the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which prohibits capital punishment).
130. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576 (2005) (noting that every country except
the United States and Somalia has joined the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child, which forbids execution of juvenile offenders); PERRY, supra note 6, at 71-72 (noting
that the United States is not a party to the Second Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, nor to the Protocol to the American Convention on
Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, both of which prohibit capital punishment).
131. PERRY, supra note 6, at 81 (arguing for the unconstitutionality of the death penalty,
partially on the ground that “[t]he list of ‘retentionist’ liberal democracies is quite small”).
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clearly that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was
thought to be necessary to prevent Congress from adopting the
punishment practices of Europe, which included torture devices like
“racks and gibbets.”132 For example, Patrick Henry argued in the
Virginia Convention that if the Constitution did not require the
federal government to stay within common law bounds, “Congress
may introduce the practice of the civil law, in preference to that of
the common law. They may introduce the practice of France, Spain,
and Germany—of torturing, to extort a confession of the crime.”133
Even more colorfully, Abraham Holmes got up in the Massachusetts
convention and gave the following dire warning:
On the whole, when we fully consider this matter, and fully
investigate the powers granted, explicitly given, and specially
delegated, we shall find Congress possessed of powers enabling
them to institute judicatories little less inauspicious than a
certain tribunal in Spain, which has long been the disgrace of
Christendom: I mean that diabolical institution, the Inquisition.
What gives an additional glare of horror to these gloomy
circumstances is the consideration, that Congress have to
ascertain, point out, and determine, what kind of punishments
shall be inflicted on persons convicted of crimes. They are
nowhere restrained from inventing the most cruel and unheard-
of punishments, and annexing them to crimes; and there is no
constitutional check on them, but that racks and gibbets may be
amongst the most mild instruments of their discipline.134
As these speeches indicate, a prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments was thought to be necessary to protect American
citizens from foreign punishment standards, not to bring American
punishments into accordance therewith. This concern is consistent
with the original meaning of “cruel and unusual,” which is cruel in
light of the “long usage of the common law,”135 not cruel in light of
contemporary international practice.
132. See 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 111 (photo. reprint 1987) (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1888)
[hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES].
133. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 132, at 447-48.
134. 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 132, at 111.
135. See Stinneford, The Original Meaning of Unusual, supra note 8, at 1819.
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C. What Is Needed
What is needed is an approach to constitutional interpretation
that suffers from neither the weaknesses of Scalia-type originalism
nor those of living originalism. Such an approach would be sensitive
to social change,136 but also consistent with principles of entrench-
ment, popular sovereignty, and the rule of law. As it turns out, the
true original meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause has these characteristics. It is set forth below.
II. DESUETUDE AND ORIGINAL MEANING
Scalia-type originalism and living originalism both tend to ignore
the word “unusual” in the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,
treating the Clause as a bare prohibition of cruel punishments.137
The reason for this is fairly obvious: there is no clear connection
between a punishment’s rarity and its cruelty. A law mandating the
public torture of all sex offenders, for example, would seem crueler
than a law calling upon courts to impose torture only on rare
136. See Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519,
545 (2003) (suggesting that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause might have originally
been meant to “incorporate[ ] some aspects of present-day circumstances as relevant
variables”).
137. Indeed, Justice Scalia dismisses the word “unusual” in almost precisely the same
language as that used by the Supreme Court’s nonoriginalists. Chief Justice Warren’s
plurality opinion in Trop v. Dulles, which announced the quintessentially nonoriginalist
“evolving standards of decency” test, had this to say about the word “unusual”: 
On the few occasions this Court has had to consider the meaning of the phrase,
precise distinctions between cruelty and unusualness do not seem to have been
drawn. These cases indicate that the Court simply examines the particular
punishment involved in light of the basic prohibition against inhuman
treatment, without regard to any subtleties of meaning that might be latent in
the word “unusual.” If the word “unusual” is to have any meaning apart from the
word “cruel,” however, the meaning should be the ordinary one, signifying
something different from that which is generally done.
356 U.S. 86, 100-01 n.32 (1958) (plurality opinion). Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), argues that the word “unusual” meant “contrary
to law” in the English Bill of Rights, but then asserts (without historical evidence) that the
term “could hardly mean” illegal in the context of the Eighth Amendment. Justice Scalia then
adopts the Trop definition of “unusual,” asserting that it must mean “such as [does not]
occu[r] in ordinary practice.” Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 973-76 (plurality opinion) (citation
omitted). In practice, both the nonoriginalists and Justice Scalia ignore the word “unusual.”
See Stinneford, The Original Meaning of Unusual, supra note 8, at 1749-51, 1763-65.
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occasions. Given the lack of an intuitive connection between rarity
and cruelty, it is natural and predictable that courts and commenta-
tors would largely ignore the word “unusual.”138
This understandable neglect is based on an interpretive error. As
I have shown in previous articles, the word “unusual” in the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause does not mean “rare,” but
“new.”139 More specifically, it means “contrary to the long usage of
the common law.”140 The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
forbids punishments that are cruel in light of longstanding practice.
A. Common Law, Custom, and Long Usage
As described in Part I.A.4, above, Justice Scalia presents two
views of the common law in his account of constitutional interpreta-
tion. He claims that at the time the Constitution came into being,
the common law was falsely seen as “a preexisting body of rules,
uniform throughout the nation.”141 Justice Scalia argues that the
Legal Realists debunked this view, showing that the common law is
nothing more than judges making up law as they go, based on their
view of “the most desirable resolution of [any given] case.”142
138. On occasion, some Justices and scholars have attempted to define the meaning of the
word “unusual.” In Furman v. Georgia, Justice Stewart implied that the term might mean
“wantonly and ... freakishly imposed,” like being “struck by lightning.” 408 U.S. 238, 309-10
(1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Douglas argued in the same case that “unusual”
means “discriminatory” with respect to “race, religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if
it is imposed under a procedure that gives room for the play of such prejudices.” Id. at 242
(Douglas, J., concurring); see also, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME
COURT’S OBSTACLE COURSE 41 (1982) (stating that the term means “something different from
that which [was] ordinarily done” at the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted); Laurence
Claus, The Antidiscrimination Eighth Amendment, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 122 (2004)
(stating that the term means “immorally discriminatory”); Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:” The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 840 (1969)
(stating that the term is “constitutional ‘boilerplate’”); Harold Hongju Koh, International Law
as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 46 (2004) (arguing that the Supreme Court
interprets “unusual” to mean uncommon in light of “foreign and international practice” as well
as domestic practice); Perry, Is Capital Punishment Unconstitutional?, supra note 99, at 880
(stating that the term means “[n]ot common; not frequent; rare,” as defined in Samuel
Johnson’s A Dictionary of the English Language).
139. See Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 8, at 935-61; Stinneford, The
Original Meaning of Unusual, supra note 8, at 1766-823.
140. See Stinneford, The Original Meaning of Unusual, supra note 8, at 1766-823.
141. Scalia, supra note 41, at 10.
142. Id. at 13.
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Although this narrative is widely shared among lawyers and
academics today, it is false. 
At the time the Constitution was adopted (and for centuries prior
to that time), the common law was not seen as the product of judges
exercising a “legislative function,”143 nor was it seen as the series of
fixed, transcendent rules Justice Holmes mockingly described as a
“brooding omnipresence in the sky.”144 Rather, the common law was
considered to be a kind of customary law—the law of “custom” and
“long usage.”145 The basic idea was that a practice that enjoyed long
usage throughout the jurisdiction obtained the force of law, despite
the fact that it had never been mandated by king or parliament.146
Such laws were considered normatively superior to laws imposed by
the sovereign because long usage guaranteed that they were
reasonable and that they enjoyed the consent of the people. These
ideas were stated succinctly in 1612 by Sir John Davies, Attorney
General for Ireland, in the Dedication to his Irish Reports:
For the Common lawe of England is nothing else but the
Common custome of the Realme:.... 
For a Custome taketh beginning & groweth to perfection in
this manner. When a reasonable act once done, is found to bee
good & beneficiall to the people, & agreeable to theire nature &
143. HOLMES, supra note 62.
144. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
145. See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 45, at *64 (describing the common law as custom
that enjoys “long and immemorial usage” and “universal reception throughout the kingdom”);
EDWARD COKE, THE COMPLEAT COPYHOLDER (1630), reprinted in 2 THE SELECTED WRITINGS
AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 563, 563 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003) (“Customes are
defined to be a Law, or Right not written, which being established by long use, and the
consent of our Ancestors, hath been, and is daily practised.”); THOMAS USK, TESTAMENT OF
LOVE, bk. III, ch. 1, ll. 78-83 (R. Allen Shoaf ed., 1998) (c. 1380) (“But custome is a thyng that
is accepted for right or for lawe, there as lawe and right faylen.... [C]ustome is of commen
usage by length of tyme used, and custome nat writte is usage; and if it be writte, constitutyon
it is ywritten and ycleped.”); 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 435 (James DeWitt Andrews ed.,
Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1896) (“[L]ong customs, approved by the consent of those who use
them, acquire the qualities of a law.”).
146. As Grant Gilmore and others have shown, the claim that common law judges never
did anything other than identify and apply longstanding customs was exaggerated. See, e.g.,
GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 5-7 (1977). Nonetheless, the common law
judges did see such identification and application of longstanding custom as their main duty.
More importantly for our purposes, the common law’s dependence on long usage gave it the
capacity to resist governmental innovations that threatened common law rights. See, e.g., THE
WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 145, at 185-87. 
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disposition, then do they use it, & practise it, againe, & againe,
& so by often iteration & multiplication of the act, it becometh
a Custome, & being continued without interruption time out of
minde, it obtaineth the force of a lawe.
And this Customary lawe is the most perfect, & most excel-
lent, and without comparison the best, to make & preserve a
commonwealth, for the written lawes which are made either by
the edicts of Princes, or by Counselles of estate, are imposed
uppon the subject before any Triall or Probation made, whether
the same bee fitt & agreeable to the nature & disposition of the
people, or whether they will breed any inconvenience or no. But
a Custome doth never become a lawe to binde the people, untill
it hath bin tried & approved time out of minde, during all which
time there did thereby arise no inconvenience, for if it had beene
found inconvenient at any time, it had been used no longer, but
had beene interrupted, & consequently it had lost the vertue &
force of a lawe.147
These ideas—that the common law is the law of custom and long
usage; that long usage demonstrates that a law is “fit and agree-
able” to the people it governs; and that long usage makes the
common law normatively superior to law imposed by the sover-
eign—were often repeated by English and American legal and
political thinkers ranging from Edward Coke and William
Blackstone to John Adams and James Wilson.148
147. JOHN DAVIES, A Preface Dedicatory, in LE PRIMER REPORT DES CASES & MATTERS EN
LEY RESOLUES & ADIUDGES EN LES COURTS DEL ROY EN IRELAND *2 (Dublin, 1615); see also J.
G. A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW 30-55 (1987).
148. See supra note 145; see also BLACKSTONE, supra note 45, at *70 (asserting that when
a statute is enacted to change a common law rule, the typical result is that “the wisdom of the
rule hath in the end appeared from the inconveniences that have followed the innovation”);
1 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND, reprinted in 2 THE SELECTED
WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE, supra note 145, at 577, 740 (“[W]hen any
innovation or new invention starts up, ... trie it with the Rules of the common Law, ... for
these be true Touchstones to sever the pure gold from the drosse and sophistications of
novelties and new inventions. And by this example you may perceive, That the rule of the old
common Law being soundly ... applied to such novelties, it doth utterly crush them and bring
them to nothing.”); 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 145, at 453 (“It is the
characteristic of a system of common law that it be accommodated to the circumstances, the
exigencies, and the conveniences of the people, by whom it is appointed.”). Edward Corwin has
shown that the idea of “immemorial usage as superior to human rule-making” dates back at
least as far as Sophocles, and that the English common law had been equated with “right
reason” since at least the fourteenth century. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE “HIGHER LAW”
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These ideas were important because they gave rise to the English,
and later the American, conception of rights enforceable against the
sovereign.149 Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
two views of governmental power struggled for dominance. Propo-
nents of absolute sovereignty argued that the sovereign was the
source of all law and therefore could not be constrained by law.150 In
contrast, common law thinkers argued that sovereign power was
limited by the fundamental principles and practices of the common
law.151 They argued that the common law predated the sovereign
BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 6, 26 (1955).
149. Edward Coke, for example, identified the common law as the source of numerous
rights and liberties of citizens. See EDWARD COKE, Dr. Bonham’s Case, reprinted in 1 THE
SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE, supra note 145, at 264, 277
[hereinafter COKE, Dr. Bonham’s Case] (identifying the right not to be subjected to double
jeopardy); 2 COKE, supra note 148, at 858 (identifying the right to due process of law); id.
(identifying the right to indictment by grand jury); id. at 862-64 (identifying the right to
habeas corpus relief); Edward Coke, Petition of Right (June 2, 1628), in 3 THE SELECTED
WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE, supra note 145, at 1225, 1228-91 [hereinafter
Coke, Petition of Right] (identifying the right to taxation only with the consent of Parliament).
Coke described the Magna Carta itself as “but a confirmation or restitution of the Common
Law.” 1 COKE, supra note 148, at 697.
150. See, e.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 45, at *90 (“[T]he legislature, being in truth the
sovereign power, is always ... of absolute authority.”); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 91 (E.P.
Dutton & Co. 1950) (1651) (ascribing to the sovereign “the whole power of prescribing the
Rules, whereby every man may know, what Goods he may enjoy, and what Actions he may
doe, without being molested by any of his fellow Subjects”); KING JAMES I, THE TRUE LAW OF
FREE MONARCHIES, in CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS OF THE REIGN OF JAMES I 1603-1625, at
9, 9-10 (J.R. Tanner ed., 1960) (1598) (“Kings [are] the authors and makers of the laws and
not the laws of the Kings.... [T]he King is above the law as both the author and giver of
strength thereto.”); JOHN MILTON, BRIEF NOTES UPON A LATE SERMON, TITL’D, THE FEAR OF
GOD AND THE KING 11 (photo. reprint 1977) (Mathew Griffith, D.D. 1660) (“[T]he Parliament
is above all positive Law ... whether civil or common, makes or unmakes them both.”); GEORGE
SAVILE, POLITICAL THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS (1750), reprinted in THE COMPLETE WORKS
OF GEORGE SAVILE, FIRST MARQUESS OF HALIFAX 209, 214 (Walter Raleigh ed., Claredon Press
1912) (“If the Common Law is Supream, then those are so who judge what is the Common
Law; and if none but the Parliament can judge so, there is an end of the Controversy.... There
is then no other Fundamental, but that every Supream Power must be Arbitrary.”); see also
Arthur E. Bonfield, The Abrogation of Penal Statutes by Nonenforcement, 49 IOWA L. REV. 389,
398 (1964) (“The development of the modern nation state was achieved through absolute
monarchism. The King was seen as completely sovereign. To admit that his statutory
commands could be invalidated, even by his long failure to enforce them on a widespread
practice of nonobservance, was to deny that absolute sovereignty.”) (footnote omitted).
151. See, e.g., CHARLES HERLE, A FULLER ANSWER TO A TREATISE WRITTEN BY DOCTOR
FERNE 6 (London, 1642) (arguing that legislation should not displace fundamental common
law principles: “[A] foundation must not be stirr’d while the building stands.... Magna Charta,
where most of these fundamentals are (at least) implyed was Law before ‘twas Written, and
but there, and then, collected for easier conservation and use”); JOHN WHITEHALL, THE
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and gave the sovereign its authority, and that the common law
better reflected natural principles of justice than could any exercise
of sovereign will.152
The great battles of English and early American constitutional
history all involved a contest between claims of absolute sovereign
power and claims that such power was limited by the common law.
When English kings and queens used the rack against suspected
enemies, common lawyers argued that such practices were illegal
because torture was contrary to long usage.153 During the back-and-
forth struggles between king and parliament throughout the
seventeenth century, the holder of state power, whether king or
parliament, frequently claimed absolute sovereignty unconstrained
by law,154 whereas the power-holder’s opponents claimed that the
common law limited sovereign authority.155 The American Revolu-
tion itself was justified as a struggle to preserve the common law
rights of American colonists156 against a British parliament that
LEVIATHAN FOUND OUT 53-54 (London, 1679) (arguing that if the fundamental basis for law
is sovereign will rather than long usage, then “down goes the Common Law, ... and then let
the strongest take all”). See generally J. W. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1955) (describing seventeenth and eighteenth century views of the
common law as fundamental law).
152. See, e.g., 4 EDWARD COKE, REPORTS, in 1 THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF
SIR EDWARD COKE, supra note 145, at 1, 102 (“The King is under no man, but onely God and
the Law, for the Law makes the King: Therefore let the king attribute that to the Law, which
from the law he hath received, to wit, power and dominion: for where will, and not law doth
sway there is no King.”); DAVIES, supra note 147 (arguing that legislation and royal edicts are
normatively inferior to the common law because they “are imposed uppon the Subject before
any Triall or Probation made, whether the same bee fitt & agreeable to the nature &
disposition of the people, or whether they will breed any inconvenience or no”).
153. See, e.g., 3 COKE, supra note 148, at 1025 (“[U]pon this occasion [the installation of the
rack in the Tower of London], Sir John Fortescue Chiefe Justice of England, wrote his Book
in commendation of the lawes of England; and therein preferreth the same for the government
of this countrey before the Civill Law; and particularly that all tortures and torments of
parties accused were directly against the Common Lawes of England.”); see also SIR JOHN
FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIÆ: A TREATISE IN COMMENDATION OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 71-75 (Francis Gregor trans., Cincinnati, Robert Clarke & Co. 1874) (condemning
the use of the rack).
154. See, e.g., KING JAMES I, supra note 150; MILTON, supra note 150.
155. See Stinneford, The Original Meaning of Unusual, supra note 8, at 1781-86 and
sources cited therein.
156. See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 45, at 10 (arguing that American colonists “revolted not
against the English constitution but on behalf of it”); Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the
Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L.
REV. 843, 865-66, 870-71, 890-91 (1978); see also, e.g., JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES
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claimed absolute power to make law governing the American
colonies.157
B. Desuetude and Long Usage
Desuetude is the idea that if a law is left unenforced for a long
time despite numerous enforcement opportunities, it may lose all
legal force because a negative custom has grown up against it.158
The doctrine of desuetude is an ancient one, dating back at least to
Roman law.159 It has been recognized more or less continuously
OF VIRGINIA 1766-1769, at 214-15 (John Pendleton Kennedy ed., 1906) (describing a British
plan to remove American colonists to England for trial as “highly derogatory of the Rights of
British Subjects” and “new, unusual ... unconstitutional and illegal”); John Adams, Notes of
Debates (Sept. 8, 1774), in 1 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 46 (Paul H.
Smith ed., 1976) (recording Richard Henry Lee’s argument that American rights “are built on
a fourfold foundation—on Nature, on the british Constitution, on Charters, and on
immemorial Usage”); id. at 47 (recording Roger Sherman’s assertion that American rights
were based on colonial adoption of “the common Law, not as the common Law, but as the
highest Reason”); Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress, Oct. 14, 1774,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/resolves.asp [http://perma.cc/QQT4-GB6K] (claiming
the right to “the common law of England”; asserting that American rights were based on “the
immutable laws of nature, the principles of the English constitution, and the several charters
or compacts” of the various colonies; that the colonists retained the “rights, liberties, and
immunities of free and natural-born subjects, within the realm of England”; and that these
rights included the right to “the common law of England, and more especially to the great and
inestimable priviledge of being tried by their peers of the vicinage, according to the course of
that law”).
157. Among other things, Parliament claimed the power to enact legislation that
contravened the common law rights American colonists claimed for themselves. See
Declaratory Act, 1766, 6 Geo. 3, c. 12 (Gr. Brit.), [hereinafter Declaratory Act] available at
http://perma.cc/87NU-N2VW (claiming “full power and authority to make laws and statutes
of sufficient force and validity to bind the colonies and people of America ... in all cases
whatsoever”).
158. See Bonfield, supra note 150, at 396 (observing that a statute would become desuete
“only if the long failure to enforce it was in the face of a public disregard so prevalent and long
established that one could deduce a custom of its nonobservance”); see also JOHN ERSKINE, AN
INSTITUTE OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND bk. I, at 18 (James Ivory ed., 1824). (“[A]s a posterior
statute may repeal or derogate from a prior, so a posterior custom may repeal or derogate
from a prior statute, even though that prior statute should contain a clause forbidding all
usages that might tend to weaken it; For the contrary immemorial custom sufficiently
presumes the will of the community to alter the law in all its clauses, and particularly in that
which was intended to secure it against alteration; and this presumed will of the people
operates as strongly as their express declaration.”).
159. See DIG. 1.3.32 (Julianus, Digest 84) (Charles Henry Monro trans., 1904) (“[S]tatutes
themselves are binding for no other reason than because they are accepted by the judgment
of the people .... On this principle it is also admitted law, and very rightly so, that statutes are
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throughout Western history, albeit with significant controversy
since the rise of the nation-state and the idea of absolute sover-
eignty.160
1. The Normative Basis for Desuetude
Desuetude has received attention in recent decades from constitu-
tional law scholars such as Alexander Bickel and Cass Sunstein,
who argue that desuete statutes raise due process issues similar to
those arising from unconstitutionally vague statutes.161 When a law
is not enforced for decades despite numerous open violations, this
nonenforcement creates the risk that the public will be lulled into
believing that the law no longer exists. If a prosecutor chooses to
revive the law and prosecute individuals for violating it, such
individuals might be caught off guard because they reasonably
believed the conduct was no longer illegal. The continued existence
of such laws also creates the risk that law enforcement will revive
them for improper, discriminatory reasons. Alexander Bickel argues
that these notice and discrimination issues were the true problem
with the anti-contraception statutes at issue in Poe v. Ullman.162
Similarly, Cass Sunstein suggests that the sodomy statutes struck
down in Lawrence v. Texas may have been unconstitutional
abrogated not only by the voice of one who moves to repeal them ... but also by the fact of their
falling out of use by common consent.”); see also CODE JUST. 1.17.1.10 (Justinian 534) (S.P.
Scott trans., 1934) (“Where, however, any laws contained in the ancient books have already
fallen into desuetude, We, under no circumstances, permit you to insert them; for We only
wish those to remain in force which frequent decisions have established, or the long-continued
custom of this Fair City has confirmed.”); H.F. JOLOWICZ, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE
STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 364 (1954) (“From the frequent repetition of the theory given by Julian
and from the actual examples of statutory rules said to have fallen into disuse, we can
probably say that the general classical opinion would have been that custom could prevail
against statute.”) (footnotes omitted).
160. See infra notes 185-207 and accompanying text.
161. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 152-55 (Yale Univ. Press
2d ed. 1986); Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality,
and Marriage, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 29-30, 73 (2003); see also GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON
LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 17-24 (1982); Bonfield, supra note 150, at 414 (“[D]esuetudenal
enactments ‘cast the same shadow of potentially arbitrary and abusive law enforcement as
that cast by purposefully overdrawn legislation.’”) (quoting Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm
and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 HARV. L. REV. 904, 911 (1962));
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 592
(2001).
162. See BICKEL, supra note 161, at 154. 
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primarily because their long nonenforcement created unacceptable
fair notice and discriminatory enforcement problems.163
Although courts and commentators have occasionally focused on
the fair notice issues arising from long dormant laws,164 this has not
historically been the primary justification for the doctrine of
desuetude.165 Instead, long nonenforcement of a law has been
thought to show that the law is substantively unreasonable166 and
that it does not enjoy the consent of the people.167 These arguments
have predominated because desuetude is the mirror image of “long
usage.” Just as long usage tends to show that a practice is reason-
able and enjoys public acceptance, long non-usage tends to show the
opposite.
The idea of desuetude has always been bound together with the
idea of long usage. The great common law thinker Edward Coke
compared the long usage of the common law to the refinement of
gold in a fire. He asserted that as cases get decided “by many suc-
cessions of ages,” the common law is “fined and refined” until it
reaches greater perfection than any lawmaker or group of lawmak-
ers could provide.168 This analogy implies both continuity and loss.
As the refinement continues over time, the true “gold” of the law
remains, while the dross falls away. Common law thinkers consid-
ered the “gold” of the law to include the common law rights that
developed and persisted over time, such as the right to due process
163. 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see Sunstein, supra note 161, at 73.
164. See Hill v. Smith, 1 Morris 95, 107 (Iowa 1840) (arguing that it is “contrary to the
spirit of that Anglo-Saxon liberty ... to revive, without notice, an obsolete statute, one in
relation to which long disuse and a contrary policy had induced a reasonable belief that it was
no longer in force”).
165. See Bonfield, supra note 150, at 427 (asserting that Hill v. Smith was the “only
judicial opinion ever to adequately recognize the grave fair-notice issues involved” in the
renewed enforcement of desuete statutes).
166. See, e.g., CODE JUST. 6.51.1 (Justinian 534) (S.P. Scott trans., 1932) (“And as the
[Papian Law] ... has finally fallen into desuetude, We desire that the practice of forfeitures
may, by Our agency, lose its invidious force, which was displeasing to the most eminent
jurists, who invented many ways to prevent it from taking effect.”). 
167. See, e.g., James v. Commonwealth, 12 Serg. & Rawle 220, 227 (Pa. 1825) (arguing that
laws calling for the execution of witches and gypsies had been “repealed by the voice of
humanity, and not by positive law”).
168. 1 COKE, supra note 148, at 701.
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of law,169 indictment by grand jury,170 habeas corpus,171 the right not
to be subjected to double jeopardy,172 the right to taxation only with
the consent of parliament,173 and the right not to be subjected to
cruel and unusual punishments.174
The dross of the law, on the other hand, included those once
traditional practices that fell away because they turned out to be
unreasonable or no longer fit the needs of society, and thus lost the
consent of the people. Edward Coke wrote that “Custome ... lose[s
its] being, if usage faile.”175 Similarly, Sir John Davies maintained
that if a traditional legal practice has “been found inconvenient” it
is “used no longer” and thus “los[es] the virtue and force of a
lawe.”176 James Wilson, one of the most important drafters of the
U.S. Constitution, argued that the interplay between long usage and
desuetude gave the common law its dual character as stable and
durable but also sensitive to cultural change:
It is the characteristic of a system of common law, that it may be
accommodated to the circumstances, the exigencies, and the
conveniences of the people, by whom it is appointed. Now, as
these circumstances, and exigencies, and conveniences insensi-
bly change; a proportioned change, in time and in degree must
take place in the accommodated system.... [Time] silently and
gradually introduces; it silently and gradually withdraws its
customary laws.177
169. See 2 id. at 858.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 862-64.
172. See COKE, Dr. Bonham’s Case, supra note 149, at 277 & n.55 (“Nemo debet bis puniri
pro uno delicto.”).
173. See An Act Declareing the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Setleing the
Succession of the Crown 1 W. & M., c.2 (1688), reprinted in 6 THE STATUTES OF THE REALM
142-45 (London, 1819) [hereinafter An Act Declareing] (complaining that James II had
violated longstanding common law rights by levying taxes without the consent of parliament);
Coke, Petition of Right, supra note 149, at 1288-91.
174. See An Act Declareing, supra note 173, at 143.
175. COKE, supra note 145, at 564.
176. DAVIES, supra note 147.
177. THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 145, at 453-55; see also Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516, 530 (1884) (asserting that the normative power of the common law
comes largely from its capacity to adapt to new circumstances).
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2. Conditions Necessary for Desuetude
A momentary lapse in usage was not thought to be sufficient to
make a law desuete. Just as a practice could not become part of the
common law until it was used continuously throughout the jurisdic-
tion for a long time, a law could not become desuete unless it fell out
of usage long enough to show a stable, universal consensus against
it.178
The historical literature does not agree upon a specific amount of
time a legal practice must remain out of usage179 before it can be
considered desuete, although the weight of authority appears to
conclude that the period of non-usage must last several genera-
tions—fifty to one hundred years.180 The basic idea is that non-usage
178. The rationale for requiring disuse to continue for several generations before it can
invalidate a statute was well articulated in Hill v. Smith. 1 Morris 95, 107 (Iowa 1840)
(“[P]ublic opinion would frequently be a very unsafe guide for a judicial decision. The
fluctuating feelings of the multitude frequently operated upon by momentary excitement, by
prejudice or by caprice, would very improperly be adopted as the standard of truth or sound
reason. But where the same opinions are concurred in for centuries, and after passion and
prejudice have wholly subsided, such opinions are always founded in truth and justice, and
can more safely be followed than those of the most learned and able judges. Fortified by this
authority, we pronounce it contrary to the spirit of that Anglo-Saxon liberty which we inherit,
to revive, without notice, an obsolete statute, one in relation to which long disuse and a
contrary policy had induced a reasonable belief that it was no longer in force. If custom can
make laws, it can, when long acquiesced in, recognized and countenanced by the sovereign
power, also repeal them.”).
179. “Non-usage” does not mean the same thing as “infrequent usage.” When a legal
practice continues to be used, albeit infrequently, any determination that there is a stable
societal consensus against it is not likely to be reliable. For example, the criminal price fixing
provisions of the Sherman Antitrust Act were infrequently used between 1890 (when they
were enacted) and 1955 (when the fines were increased from $5000 to $50,000). But such
provisions were enforced more frequently starting in 1959. See Vivek Ghosal & D. Daniel
Sokol, The Evolution of U.S. Cartel Enforcement, J.L. & ECON. (forthcoming), available at
http://perma.cc/L6ND-WGZD. A person looking at the rare enforcement of these provisions
in 1954 would have been mistaken in any conclusion that they had become so obsolete as to
be considered desuete.
180. See, e.g., DAINES BARRINGTON, OBSERVATIONS ON THE MORE ANCIENT STATUTES FROM
MAGNA CHARTA TO THE TWENTY-FIRST OF JAMES I CAP. XXVII. 45 (London, 5th ed. 1796)
(noting that under Scottish law, statutes become desuete after fifty years of nonenforcement);
ERSKINE, supra note 158, at 18 (“[W]here any later usage, which has been gradually gathering
strength, is pleaded upon as law, the antiquity and universality of that usage must be proved
to the judge, as any other matter of fact; for all customary law is founded on long usage, which
is fact. No precise time or number of facts is requisite for constituting custom; because some
things require in their nature longer time, and a greater frequency of acts to establish them,
than others.”); 1 FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM OF THE MODERN ROMAN LAW 138-39
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must persist long enough that we can be confident that society has
rejected the practice as unreasonable, and that this rejection is both
universal and stable.181 This period may vary because the occasions
for using certain legal practices may not occur very often. If treason
trials occur once every twenty years, for example, the failure to
execute anyone for treason during a forty year period is probably not
sufficient to show a stable societal consensus against the practice.182
A forty-year failure to execute offenders for a frequently committed
homicide offense, however, might have quite a different significance.
Other relevant factors include whether long non-usage reflects
open disregard of the law, and whether there is significant political
conflict about the law’s goodness. If a legal practice is not used for
a period of time through neglect or error, this tells us less about its
reasonableness than if there is a conscious, voluntary decision not
to use it.183 Similarly, if there is ongoing political conflict about a
law’s goodness, a period of non-usage may simply show that those
who oppose it have temporarily gained the upper hand.184 It may not
show that there is a universal, stable societal consensus against it.
The less open the non-usage, or the greater the political conflict
(William Holloway trans., 1867) (noting that some authorities hold that desuetude requires
a century of non-usage, whereas others say forty years or less, and others say it is up to the
discretion of the judge; and arguing that “it is of the utmost consequence [that the time period
be sufficient] to guard against the individual, casual, transient, through the deceitful
appearance which they may assume, being falsely regarded as indications of a common
conviction of law lying at the foundation of them”); cf. Adams v. Norris, 64 U.S. 353, 364
(1859) (arguing that under the Spanish civil law system, when a ten year custom contrary to
statutory provisions regarding the proper method of making wills is “so prevailing and
notorious that the tacit assent to it of the authorities may be presumed, it will operate to
repeal the prior law”).
181. See Bonfield, supra note 150, at 419 (“[T]here must be an absolute omission to enforce
the statute for a sufficient period to dispel any reasonable possibility that it reflects a
transitory or unsettled policy.”). 
182. See VON SAVIGNY, supra note 180, at 157 (arguing that a period of nonenforcement will
not give rise to desuetude where no occasions for enforcement have occurred; a custom of
nonenforcement can only develop when “cases [for enforcement] [have] actually arisen and
nevertheless the application of the written law been intermitted”).
183. See Bonfield, supra note 150, at 420 (arguing that desuetude “requires a sufficiently
widespread and notorious violation of the statute to assure that the administrative failure to
apply it evidences a clear policy of completely disregarding its violation”). 
184. See id. (“[W]hen the failure of a statute’s administrators to enforce it is surrounded
by active political conflict over the acceptability of such action, a longer period of
uninterrupted nonapplication will be required than when the community is relatively settled
in its acquiescence to the provision’s demise.”).
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surrounding it, the longer the period of time necessary to show that
the legal practice has become desuete.
3. Desuetude and Absolute Sovereignty
The doctrine of desuetude has become more controversial with the
rise of the nation-state and the doctrine of absolute sovereignty. If
the sovereign has absolute authority, and is the source of all law,
neither law nor custom can constrain it.185 As described in Part II.A,
above, the great English and early American constitutional battles
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries represented, in large
part, the conflict between proponents of absolute sovereignty and
proponents of the common law idea that sovereign power must be
constrained by the longstanding universal custom of the jurisdic-
tion. This conflict applied both to positive custom (common law
rights) and negative custom (desuetude).186 Because a statute
represents the exercise of sovereign will, proponents of absolute
sovereignty argued that non-usage could never negate it.187
Edward Coke stood, in many ways, at the beginning of these
controversies in England, and his writings about the common law
had great influence on the development of the English and Ameri-
can constitutional orders.188 During Coke’s career as a lawyer and
185. See KING JAMES I, supra note 150; MILTON, supra note 150; see also Declaratory Act,
supra note 157.
186. See Bonfield, supra note 150, at 398-99 (arguing that a statute “can as easily be
abrogated by ‘a genuine proper custom of not applying it’ as by ‘a custom which sets up
another positive rule instead of the written law;’ for they are really both the same”) (quoting
VON SAVIGNY, supra note 180, at 157).
187. See id. at 409 (“The doctrine of absolute sovereignty] leaves no room for the abrogation
of an English statute by a protracted administrative failure to enforce it, even in the face of
its widespread and long-continued violation. Regardless of the injustice, English courts are
always bound to apply desuetudenal acts in those prosecutions properly before them.”); see
also 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 45, at *76-77 (“[N]o custom can prevail against an express act
of parliament.”).
188. For example, Thomas Jefferson wrote, “[B]efore the revolution, Coke [on] Littleton was
the universal elementary book of law students, and a sounder [W]hig never wrote, nor of
profounder learning in the orthodox doctrines of the British constitution, or in what were
called English liberties.” 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 376 (Paul Leicester Ford
ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1899); see also CORWIN, supra note 148, at 56-57;
INTRODUCTION TO LAW, LIBERTY AND PARLIAMENT: SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE WRITINGS OF SIR
EDWARD COKE, at xiii-xiv (Allen D. Boyer ed., 2004) (“Coke’s works have been to the common
law what Shakespeare has been to literature, and the King James Bible to religion.”) (citing
William Holdsworth); id. at xiii (“Wherever the common law has been applied, Coke’s
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judge, the Stuart kings claimed the power of absolute monarchs
much more aggressively than had their Tudor predecessors.189 These
claims and the reaction they provoked led ultimately to the Petition
of Right, the English Civil War, the Glorious Revolution, and the
adoption of the English Bill of Rights.190
In his writings, Coke attempted to accommodate both the doctrine
of absolute sovereignty and the doctrine that sovereignty is limited
by the fundamental principles of the common law. On the one hand,
he acknowledged that king and parliament, acting together, had
“transcendent and absolute”191 power, and that this included the
power to “control”192 the common law. On the other hand, he
repeatedly claimed that neither king nor parliament could legiti-
mately alter fundamental common law principles, and that any
attempt to do so would endanger the very “fabrick of the Common-
wealth.”193 Coke sometimes tried to reconcile these conflicting views
by claiming that the king and parliament had too much wisdom
(“ultimum Sapientiae”)194 to pass laws that fundamentally conflict
with the common law. Sometimes, however, he simply asserted that
any royal or parliamentary effort to alter fundamental common law
principles would be “void.”195 For example, acting as a royal judge,
Coke famously stated in dicta that parliament lacked the authority
to make a party a judge in its own case, for this would violate basic
principles of justice reflected in the common law.196 Acting as a
member of parliament, Coke led the charge for the Petition of Right,
arguing that the royal prerogative power was limited by fundamen-
tal common law principles such as those reflected in the Magna
Carta.197
influence has been monumental.”); STEPHEN D. WHITE, SIR EDWARD COKE AND “THE
GRIEVANCES OF THE COMMONWEALTH,” 1621-1628, at 9-11 (1979).
189. See Stinneford, The Original Meaning of Unusual, supra note 8, at 1781.
190. See id. at 1781-86.
191. 4 COKE, supra note 148, at 1133.
192. 1 id. at 711.
193. 2 id. at 907.
194. 4 id. at 1067.
195. See COKE, Dr. Bonham’s Case, supra note 149, at 275.
196. See id.
197. See Coke, Petition of Right, supra note 149 (“I know that prerogative is part of the law,
but “Sovereign Power” is no parliamentary word.... Take we heed what we yield unto: Magna
Charta is such a fellow, that he will have no ‘Sovereign.’ I wonder this ‘Sovereign’ was not in
Magna Charta, or in the confirmations of it. If we grant this, by implication we give a
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Coke’s treatment of desuetude reflected a similar balancing act.
He denied that desuetude could invalidate a statute, asserting that
“a man cannot prescribe or alledge a custome against a statute,”198
and that “an act of parliament by non-user [cannot] be antiquated
or lose his force.”199 At the same time, he argued that long
nonenforcement of a statute may affect the way it is interpreted,
permitting judges to conclude that it does not impose the prohibi-
tions and penalties it seems to impose: “as usage is a good inter-
preter of lawes, so non usage ... is a great intendment that the law
will not beare it.”200
More significantly for our purposes, Coke identified one category
of statute that a contrary custom could void: declaratory statutes.
A declaratory statute is an act of parliament that does not purport
to create new law, but merely restates the custom of the realm.201
Sometimes declaratory statutes were enacted to reaffirm fundamen-
tal common law rights. For example, Magna Carta and the numer-
ous statutes enacted to reaffirm it were all considered declaratory
statutes. Sometimes declaratory statutes affirmed more mundane
common law rules, such as the rule that it is unlawful to cut down
trees in a forest “without the view of the Forester.”202 
Because a declaratory statute purports to say what the custom of
the realm is, it may be voided if the evidence shows that the actual
‘Sovereign Power’ above all laws.”).
198. EDWARD COKE, 1 THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 170
(Phila., Johnson & Warner, & Samuel R. Fisher, Jr. 1812).
199. Id. § 108.
200. Id. Coke’s ambivalence as to how to treat desuete statutes is typical of the attitude
reflected in a variety of seventeenth and eighteenth century English legal sources. See, e.g.,
The King v. Cnty. of Cumberland, [1795] 101 Eng. Rep. 507 (K.B.) (refusing to apply a statute
that had not been enforced for ninety years); Leigh v. Kent, [1789] 100 Eng. Rep. 621, 622
(K.B.) (“[W]here the words of an Act of Parliament are plain it cannot be repealed by non-user,
yet when there has been a series of practice, without any exception, it goes a long way to
explain them where there is any ambiguity.”); An Act for Repealing an Act Made in the First
Year of the Reign of King Henry the Fifth, 14 Geo. 3, c. 58 (1774) [hereinafter An Act for
Repealing an Act] (noting that the acts referenced in the statute’s title “have been found, by
long Usage, to be unnecessary, and are become obsolete” and explicitly repealing such acts
“[i]n order ... to obviate all Doubts that may arise upon the same”); see also FARDINANDO
PULTON, KALENDAR OF ALL THE STATUTES (1608 & 1617) (marking a variety of statutes as
“obsoletum, that is, worn out of use”); Bonfield, supra note 150, at 406-07 (discussing these
sources).
201. See An Act for Repealing an Act, supra note 200 (noting that previous statutes have
been rendered obsolete through custom).
202. See COKE, supra note 148, at 709. 
574 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:531
custom is contrary to the statute. For example, Coke discussed a
declaratory statute from the time of Edward I that affirmed a
common law rule forbidding anyone from cutting down trees in his
own forest “without the view of [a] Forester.”203 During the reign of
Queen Elizabeth I, Coke noted, a man was able to defeat a prosecu-
tion for violating this statute by showing that the actual custom
permitted him to cut down trees in the forest even if the forester
was not present. Just as a litigant is permitted to “alleage a
Custome against the Common Law, so a man may doe so against [a
declaratory] Statute.”204
To the extent Coke’s writings implied that the long usage (or long
non-usage) of the common law could undermine or void an unrea-
sonable statute, such implications were increasingly rejected in
eighteenth century England, as parliament consolidated its status
as the possessor of absolute sovereign power.205 For example,
although William Blackstone agreed with Coke and other common
law thinkers that the common law was normatively superior to
statutory law, he denied that the common law could ever void a
statute—parliament possessed “absolute despotic power”206 that
could not be controlled by the common law or anything else. The
Americans who revolted against England and insisted on the Bill of
Rights had very different ideas about the relationship between
sovereign power and customary rights.207 These ideas will be
discussed in the next Part.
C. Desuetude and the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
The United States Constitution is, in some ways, quite different
from the English constitution. The United States Constitution does
not derive its authority from custom208 but from a formal act of
ratification by the people, who are themselves conceived as the
203. See id.
204. See id.; see also Bonfield, supra note 150, at 406 (“[I]f there is a long failure to enforce
a statute declaratory of the common law on an inconsistent practice, it may be expressly
abrogated.”).
205. See Stinneford, The Original Meaning of Unusual, supra note 8, at 1789-90.
206. BLACKSTONE, supra note 45, at *90.
207. See Stinneford, The Original Meaning of Unusual, supra note 8, at 1792-1810.
208. For a discussion of the customary nature of the English Constitution, see POCOCK,
supra note 147, at 30-69.
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sovereign.209 The United States Constitution also creates a federal
government with supreme but limited, enumerated powers, unlike
the general authority possessed by the English sovereign.210 But the
anti-Federalists who opposed ratification of the Constitution, and
who ultimately forced the adoption of the Bill of Rights, did not
consider popular sovereignty or federalism to be sufficient protec-
tion against the potentially despotic power of the new federal
government.211 They were particularly concerned about the fact that
the federal government would not be bound by the fundamental
principles of the common law, and they insisted on a Bill of Rights
that would ensure the new government did not transgress these
bounds.212 One of the rights included in the Bill of Rights was the
prohibition of Cruel and Unusual Punishments,213 a common law
right that had been included in the English Bill of Rights a century
209. See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People ... do ordain and establish this Constitution for
the United States of America.”); see also, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 42, at 55-61; Amar,
supra note 43, at 35-37; McConnell, supra note 43.
210. See, e.g., James Wilson, Speech Before the Pennsylvania Convention for Ratification
of the United States Constitution (Nov. 20, 1787), in ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 132, at
453-54 (“[The new federal government’s powers] are particularly enumerated. In [such a] case,
the implied result is, that nothing more is intended to be given than what is so enumerated,
unless it results from the nature of the government itself.”).
211. See Stinneford, The Original Meaning of Unusual, supra note 8, at 1800-08 and
sources cited therein.
212. See id.; see also, e.g., Letter from the Federal Farmer to the Republican, No. 3 (Oct.
10, 1787), reprinted in LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN 13, 24
(Walter Hartwell Bennett ed., 1978) (“I confess in the constitution of this supreme court, as
left by the constitution, I do not see a spark of freedom or a shadow of our own or the British
common law.”); Abraham Holmes, Speech in the Massachusetts Convention for the Ratif-
ication of the United States Constitution, in ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 132, at 109, 111
(arguing that the lack of common law constraints in the Constitution would allow Congress
to transform itself into the equivalent of the Spanish Inquisition); George Mason, Objections
to this Constitution of Government (Sept. 15, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 637, 637-40 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (“There is no
Declaration of Rights.... Nor are the people secured even in the enjoyment of the benefit of the
common law.”).
213. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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before,214 but that was thought to date back to early English
history.215
In both England and America, “cruel and unusual” meant cruel
in light of the long usage of the common law.216 The Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause forbids legislatures and judges from
imposing punishments that are significantly harsher than prior
practice would permit.217 Thus, the Clause makes statutes authoriz-
ing criminal punishments analogous to the declaratory statutes
discussed earlier.218 Like a declaratory statute, punishment statutes
214. The prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments” first appeared in 1689, in the
English Bill of Rights. See An Act Declareing, supra note 173, at 143 (prohibiting “cruell and
unusuall Punishments”). In 1776, George Mason included this prohibition in the Virginia
Declaration of Rights. See VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. IX (1776), available at
http://perma.cc/M4DU-ANUA. By the time the United States Constitution was ratified, nine
state constitutions prohibited “cruel and unusual,” “cruel or unusual,” or “cruel” punishments.
See Stinneford, The Original Meaning of Unusual, supra note 8, at 1798-99 and sources cited
therein. The Virginia ratifying convention included this prohibition in its proposed
amendments to the United States Constitution. See ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF
THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776-1791, at 174 (1983). James Madison ultimately proposed the
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments to the First Congress, and it was adopted as
part of the Bill of Rights. See id. at 202.
215. See 10 H.C. JOUR. 247 (1689) (noting the “ancient Right of the People of England that
they should not be subjected to cruel and unusual Punishments”).
216. During the American Revolution and again during the debates over the ratification
of the United States Constitution, Americans consistently used the word “unusual” to
condemn governmental actions that transgress common law bounds established through long
usage. For example, in the run-up to the American Revolution the Virginia House of
Burgesses called an English plan to try American protesters in England “new, unusual, ...
unconstitutional and illegal.” JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES 1766-1769, at 215 (John
Pendleton Kennedy ed., 1906); see also, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 6 (U.S.
1776) (complaining of the recent English practice of calling colonial legislatures at “places
unusual,” that is, non-customary locations). Similarly, during the debate over ratification of
the United States Constitution, Patrick Henry argued that because the new federal
government was not constrained by the common law, it would be a disastrous series of “new
and unusual experiments in government,” and that Congress would abuse the Treaty Power,
the Militia Power, and the power to prosecute crime, respectively, to inflict “unusual
punishments,” “unusual and severe punishments,” and “cruel and unusual punishments.” See
Patrick Henry, Speech to the Virginia Ratifying Convention for the United States
Constitution (June 9, 1788), in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 132, at 172, 412, 447-48, 503-
04; see also, e.g., Mason, supra note 212 (warning that the lack of common law constraints in
the new Constitution would permit Congress to create “new crimes, inflict unusual and severe
punishments, and extend their powers”). See generally Stinneford, The Original Meaning of
Unusual, supra note 8, at 1792-1810.
217. See generally Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 8; Stinneford, The
Original Meaning of Unusual, supra note 8.
218. See supra Part II.B.3.
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can become void if they are inconsistent with the actual custom of
the jurisdiction—at least where their deviation from custom is in
the direction of greater cruelty.
The requirement that punishment statutes comply with long-
standing custom was meant to prevent the government from
imposing barbaric methods of punishment that were not part of the
common law tradition, such as the “racks and gibbets” employed by
the Inquisition.219 It was also meant to prevent the government from
imposing punishments that were cruel because they were excessive
in relation to the crime for which they were imposed.220 The basic
method for determining whether a punishment was barbaric or
excessive was to compare it to punishment practices that enjoyed
long usage.221
1. Ducking and Desuetude: The Treatment of Once Traditional   
        Punishments in State Courts
The United States Supreme Court did not decide a case under the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause until nearly a century after
the Bill of Rights was adopted.222 During this time period, however,
there were a handful of state court decisions concerning state consti-
tutional analogues to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.223
Virtually all of these decisions recognized that a punishment was
cruel and unusual if it was unduly harsh in light of long usage.224
One of these decisions, James v. Commonwealth, demonstrated
that a once traditional punishment could become unusual if it fell
out of usage for a sufficient period of time.225 Nancy James was
convicted of being a “common scold” and was sentenced to be placed
on a “ducking or cucking-stool” and “plunged three times in the
water.”226 She appealed this sentence to the Pennsylvania Supreme
219. See ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 132.
220. See Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 8, at 907.
221. See id. at 968-78; Stinneford, The Original Meaning of Unusual, supra note 8, at 1815-
19.
222. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
223. See Stinneford, The Original Meaning of Unusual, supra note 8, at 1810-13 and cases
cited therein.
224. See id.; see also Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 8, at 947-52.
225. 12 Serg. & Rawle 220, 227 (Pa. 1825).
226. Id. at 220, 225.
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Court, arguing that the punishment was unconstitutionally cruel,
and that the cruelty of the punishment was shown by the fact that
it had fallen out of usage many years before.227
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court started by taking the position
that the “long disuetude of any law amounts to its repeal.”228 As
societal circumstances and attitudes change, so that the law’s
“objects vanish or [its] reason ceases,” long non-usage may render
the law “obsolete.”229 In other words, “total disuse of any civil
institution for ages past, may afford just and rational objections
against disrespected and superannuated ordinances.”230
The common law doctrine of desuetude is a particularly important
constraint on criminal punishment, the James court asserted,
because it allows the law to accommodate societal advancements in
“manners” and “education” through the “silent and gradual disuse
of barbarous criminal punishments.”231 The court noted several
examples of once traditional punishments that lost their validity
through long non-usage. These included laws calling for the
execution of witches and gypsies, neither of which had been enforced
for over a century, and which thus had been “repealed by the voice
of humanity, and not by positive law.”232 Similarly, the punishment
for those convicted of conspiracy had once been to be “discredited as
jurors or witnesses, to forfeit their goods and chattels and lands for
life, to have their fields wasted, houses razed, their trees rooted up,
their own bodies committed to prison.”233 But this punishment was
made “obsolete” by “long disuse” and was replaced by a punishment
of “fine and imprisonment, or the pillory.”234 The common law also
permitted numerous methods of punishment, many of which were
barbarous by the standards of 1825. These methods included
execution by “hanging, burning, boiling, pressing,” and noncapital
punishments such as “cutting off the hand or ear, burning or
branding the hand, face, shoulders, whipping, imprisonment,
stocking, sitting in the pillory, or on the cucking-stool.... pulling out
227. See id. at 221-22.
228. Id. at 227.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 228.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 227.
233. Id. at 228.
234. Id.
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the tongue for false rumors, cutting off the nose, and for adultery,
taking away the privy parts.”235 Some of these punishments—such
as hanging, imprisonment, and the pillory—were still in use. But
others had become “nothing more than the memorials of times that
are past, as the usages of our uncivilized ancestors.”236 Because such
practices had suffered long non-usage, they were—“Blessed be
GOD!”237—no longer part of the Anglo-American legal tradition.
The James court considered ducking to be a barbarous punish-
ment comparable to those listed above because it was degrading to
women and to the old and poor, and because it imposed this
degradation without advancing any evident social good.238 The
punishment was “revolting to humanity” and was “invented in an
age of barbarism.”239 It arose at a time when men were allowed to
beat their wives, and when literate women were denied the benefit
of clergy in capital cases, so that they would be executed for the
same crimes for which “their more ignorant husbands, who could
with difficulty read even the neck-verse, were burnt in the hand
with a cold iron.”240 Only a woman could be subjected to ducking
“while the most scandalously abusive and railing man goes unpun-
ished.”241 This disparity showed that ducking “degraded woman to
a mere thing, to a nuisance, and does not consider her as a
person.”242 The practice was also objectionable because it discrimi-
nated against the poor and the old: “it was never intended for the
rich, and never was inflicted on beauty and youth.”243 Finally,
ducking failed to advance the legitimate purposes of punishment:
If the reformation of the culprit, and prevention of the crime, be
the just foundation and object of all punishments, nothing could
be further removed from these salutary ends, than the infliction
in question. It destroys all personal respect; the women thus
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See id. at 225-26, 229.
239. Id. at 225.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 226.
242. Id. at 225.
243. Id. at 230.
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punished would scold on for life, and the exhibition would be far
from being beneficial to the spectators.244
The fact that ducking had “sunk in oblivion, in the general
improvement of society”245 demonstrated its barbarity and cruelty.
It had ceased to be imposed in England over a century before: “[N]o
poor woman, in that country, has suffered under the edge of a law
so barbarous, for the last century; like unscoured armor, it is hung
up by the wall; like the law of witchcraft, it has remained un-
used.”246 The last time anyone tried to impose ducking in England,
Chief Justice Holt rejected it on the ground that it would “only
harden the criminal; and, if she were once ducked, she would scold
all the days of her life.”247 Although two women in Pennsylvania
were subjected to ducking toward the end of the eighteenth century,
the James court refused to give any weight to these precedents
because the judges who imposed them were not lawyers and did not
understand the common law.248 Aside from these two examples,
there was no evidence that ducking had ever become part of the
common usage of Pennsylvania.249 The practice had been implicitly
disallowed by the penal code of 1790, the object of which was the
“abolition of all infamous, disgraceful, public punishments—all cruel
and unnatural punishments—for all the classes of minor offences
and misdemeanors, to which they had been before applied.”250 No
instances of punishment by ducking had arisen in over forty years
prior to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in James.251
For all of these reasons, the James court held that the once
traditional punishment of ducking was no longer permissible under
Pennsylvania common law. Because the punishment lacked legal
authorization, the court declined to decide whether it was unconsti-
tutionally cruel.252 But the James court strongly implied that the
long non-usage of this practice was conclusive evidence of its
244. Id. at 234.
245. Id. at 225.
246. Id. at 226-27.
247. Id. at 229.
248. See id. at 233.
249. Id. at 232-33.
250. Id. at 231.
251. Id. at 234.
252. Id. at 235-36.
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cruelty, and concluded by expressing the hope “that we shall
hereafter hear nothing of the ducking-stool, or other remains of the
customs of barbarous ages.”253
253. Id. at 236 (quoting DUPONCEAU ON JURISDICTION 96). Early American courts were
divided as to whether desuetude could invalidate a statute in cases that did not involve a
claim that the statute imposed a cruel and unusual punishment or violated another
customary right embedded in the Constitution. Some courts asserted that desuetude was not,
in itself, sufficient ground for invalidating a statute. Interestingly, this assertion appears to
have been dicta in most such cases because the conditions necessary for desuetude had not
been established. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hoover, 1 Browne’s Reports, App. 25, 28-29 (Pa.
Ct. Com. Pl. 1811) (expressing ambivalence as to whether a statute could be invalidated
through desuetude, but concluding that the statute in question was not desuete because it had
been revisited by the state assembly seven years before this case arose). Also in Respublica
v. Comm’rs, 4 Yeates 181 (Pa. 1805), the court upheld a 1795 statute despite the fact that the
authorities had followed an agreement not to enforce the statute between 1800 and 1805. In
reaching this decision, the court asserted that “[a] statute cannot be repealed by non-user.”
Id. at 183. This assertion was arguably dictum because a five-year gap in enforcement would
not normally be sufficient to establish desuetude. In Glancey v. Jones, 4 Yeates 212 (Pa. 1805),
the court upheld a statutory provision forbidding a sheriff from advertising land for sale
without the proper writ. In reaching this decision, the court stated, “[w]e know of no practice”
of ignoring this statute in the relevant county, but that even if there were such a practice “it
is bad in itself .... No usage can repeal the positive provisions of an act of the legislature.” Id.
at 215. In State v. Findley, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 418 (S.C. 1802), the defendant was prosecuted for
“taking away a girl under sixteen years of age, and deflowering her, without the consent of
her parents.” Id. at 418. Although neither of the parties appears to have claimed that the
statute was desuete, either the court or the case reporter noted as an aside that this
prosecution was “the first ... which ever took place in Carolina, under the statute of Philip and
Mary, for this offence.... It may not be amiss here to observe, that it does not follow that
because a statute has been a long time dormant, it is therefore to be considered as obsolete.”
Id. at 421. Other early American courts held that desuetude could invalidate a statute even
if there was no claim that the statute imposed a cruel and unusual punishment or violated
a customary right embedded in the Constitution. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lofland, 1 Del. Cas. 529
(Del. Ct. Com. Pl. 1815) (upholding sheriff ’s return of a levy that did not comply with statute
governing such returns, where there had been a twenty-seven-year practice of ignoring the
statute); Hill v. Smith, 1 Morris 95, 107 (Iowa 1840) (“If custom can make laws, it can, when
long acquiesced in, recognized and countenanced by the sovereign power, also repeal them.”);
Porter’s Appeals, 30 Pa. 496, 498-99 (1858) (“I cannot assent to the doctrine that the usages
and customs of an advancing people are incapable of displacing an Act of Assembly that has
become unfitted for modern use.... The notion that statutes are not repealable by non-user,
is founded on two cases of not very high authority, reported in 4 Yeates 181 and 215, both of
which depend on an obiter dictum in White v. Boot, 2 Term R. 275, a case that was overruled
in Leigh v. Kent, 3 Term R. 364. A proposition no better supported cannot prevail against the
clear reasoning [of cases supporting desuetude].”); Wright v. Crane, 13 Serg. & Rawle 447, 452
(Pa. 1826) (“It must be a very strong case, to justify the court in deciding, that an act standing
in the statute book, unrepealed, is obsolete and invalid. I will not say that such a case may
not exist—where there has been a nonuser for a great number of years—where, from a change
of times, and manners, an ancient sleeping statute would do great mischief, if suddenly
brought into action—where a long practice, inconsistent with it, has prevailed, and especially,
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2. Painful Death and Desuetude: The Treatment of Once              
       Traditional Punishments in the Supreme Court of the              
       United States, Part 1
From the beginning, the Supreme Court’s death penalty jurispru-
dence focused on desuetude. The Court’s very first merits decision
under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, Wilkerson v.
Utah, made a constitutional distinction between customary
punishments that are still in practice and those that fell out of
usage long ago.254 In Wilkerson, the defendant was convicted of
premeditated murder and was sentenced to be executed by firing
squad.255 He challenged this punishment as cruel and unusual.256
The Supreme Court quickly disposed of this claim by noting that
execution by shooting was a customary form of punishment that was
still regularly practiced.257
Having made this relatively easy decision, the Supreme Court
went on to contrast death by firing squad to the various forms of
punishment described in Volume Four of Blackstone’s Commentar-
ies on the Laws of England.258 Blackstone described at some length
the gruesome fate that the common law provided for those who
committed crimes like treason and murder. These punishments
added “circumstances of terror, pain, or disgrace” to the execution,
including “being drawn or dragged to the place of execution,”
“emboweling alive, beheading, and quartering,” and “public dissec-
tion.”259 Women convicted of treason were sentenced to be “burned
where, from other and later statutes, it might fairly be inferred, that, in the apprehension of
the legislature, the old one was not in force. But this is not the case [with respect to the
statute in issue].”); O’Hanlon v. Myers, 44 S.C.L. (10 Rich.) 128, 131 (S.C. 1856) (finding
colonial-era statutes criminalizing drunkenness desuete when they had been pronounced
obsolete more than a century before “by an eminent jurist and the earliest compiler of our
statute law,” and when the mode of punishment designated in the statute was no longer
available under South Carolina law); Williamson v. Bacot, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 62 (S.C. 1787)
(statute declaring particular species of money legal tender not enforceable where species has
gone out of circulation and become worthless).
254. 99 U.S. 130, 136-37 (1878).
255. Id. at 130-31.
256. Id. at 133.
257. Id. at 133-35.
258. Id. at 135.
259. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 45, at *370.
2014] DEATH, DESUETUDE, AND ORIGINAL MEANING 583
alive.”260 Although there was an “almost general mitigation” of the
cruelest aspects of these punishments—primarily by rendering the
offender unconscious before burning her or tearing him to
pieces261—they were all lawful punishments at the time Blackstone
wrote.
Although these punishments were permissible at common law,
the Wilkerson Court stated that they were obviously unconstitu-
tional under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause: “it is safe
to affirm that punishments of torture, such as those mentioned by
the commentator referred to, and all others in the same line of
unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment to the
Constitution.”262 The Wilkerson Court’s assertion that it would be
unconstitutional to add unnecessary pain or terror to executions has
become bedrock constitutional doctrine, apparently accepted by all
members of the Supreme Court in a continuous line of cases leading
up to today.263 Indeed, subsequent Supreme Court opinions have
described the Wilkerson dictum about unnecessary pain as a not
terribly noteworthy application of traditional common law punish-
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 136.
263. This unanimity was vividly displayed in the relatively recent case of Baze v. Rees, in
which every member of the the Supreme Court wrote or joined opinions citing Wilkerson with
approval, despite the fact that the Court could not reach a consensus as to how to determine
the constitutionality of death by lethal injection. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 48 (2008)
(plurality opinion) (citing Wilkerson for the proposition that the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause forbids “the deliberate infliction of pain for the sake of pain”); id. at 101
(Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Wilkerson for the proposition that the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause forbids “purposely torturous punishments”); id. at 114 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (agreeing with the holding of Wilkerson but contending that the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause forbids a broader group of punishments than those listed
therein); see also, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010) (citing Wilkerson for the
proposition that “[t]he Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits the imposition of
inherently barbaric punishments under all circumstances”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
173 (1976) (plurality opinion) (citing Wilkerson for the proposition that the death penalty
“must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain”); Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660, 676 (1962) (citing Wilkerson for the proposition that inherently cruel punishments
such as disembowelment are unconstitutional); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890)
(holding that use of the electric chair was permissible because it did not involve “torture or
a lingering death” and that, although this method of punishment “might be said to be unusual
because it was new,” it could not be called cruel because the legislature had concluded that
it was “more humane” than other methods of execution, and there was no evidence that this
conclusion was incorrect).
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ment standards.264 But how could this be, given that Wilkerson
expressly forbids what Blackstone said the common law expressly
permits? The answer is desuetude. In Blackstone’s time, gruesome
methods of execution were already falling out of usage.265 By the
time Wilkerson was decided a century later, such punishments had
fallen out of usage for so long that the Supreme Court could not
even imagine authorizing them.266 A traditional group of punish-
ments had become cruel and unusual. 
3. Excessive Punishments and Desuetude: The Treatment of         
        Once Traditional Punishments in the Supreme Court of the     
        United States, Part 2
The Supreme Court’s proportionality jurisprudence has also
incorporated desuetude from the very beginning. Justice Field’s
dissent in O’Neil v. Vermont, which was the first extended discus-
sion of excessive punishments by a Supreme Court Justice, implic-
itly relied on the doctrine of desuetude.267 Field argued that O’Neil’s
sentence of fifty-four and one-half years in prison for selling liquor
without a license was cruelly excessive because it was more severe
than “anything which I have been able to find in the records of our
courts for the present century.”268 Field did not go back to
Blackstone or to eighteenth century punishment practices more
generally. If he had done so, he would have found some punish-
ments that would appear more disproportionate than O’Neil’s—for
example, the English law authorizing the death penalty for cutting
down a cherry tree in an orchard.269 For Field, the relevant reference
point for measuring excessiveness was not all punishments ever
permitted under the English and American constitutional orders,
but only those that had had been imposed during the past
264. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947) (“The traditional
humanity of modern Anglo-American law forbids the infliction of unnecessary pain in the
execution of the death sentence.”).
265. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 45, at *370.
266. Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 136.
267. 144 U.S. 323, 337-66 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting). The majority in O’Neil declined to
consider O’Neil’s Eighth Amendment claim on the ground that the Eighth Amendment did
not apply to the states. See id. at 331-32.
268. Id. at 338.
269. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 45, at *4.
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century.270 Punishments that had not been imposed during that time
period were not relevant because their long disuse removed any
presumption of reasonableness they may once have held.
Weems v. United States, the first case in which the Supreme Court
declared a punishment cruel and unusual, also relied on the
doctrine of desuetude.271 In Weems, the defendant was sentenced to
“cadena temporal”—a punishment involving at least twelve years
imprisonment at “hard and painful labor” with shackles about the
wrists and ankles, followed by loss of numerous civil rights and
subjection to lifetime surveillance by the state272—for the strict
liability offense of entering a false statement in a public record.273
Like Justice Field’s dissent in O’Neil, the Weems majority empha-
sized that this punishment was harsher in relation to Weems’s
crime than any imposed within the American criminal justice
system in recent memory.274
The Weems court went beyond Justice Field, however, by
expressly arguing that desuetude is an engine of constitutional
development. The Court noted that:
Cooley in his Constitutional Limitations says that it may be well
doubted if the right exist “to establish the whipping post and the
pillory in those States where they were never recognized as
instruments of punishment, or in those States whose constitu-
tions, revised since public opinion had banished them, have
forbidden cruel and unusual punishments.” The clause of the
Constitution in the opinion of the learned commentators may be
therefore progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete but
may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by
a humane justice.275
270. O’Neil, 144 U.S. at 338.
271. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
272. Id. at 364-66.
273. Id. at 363.
274. Id. at 366-67, 377 (“Such penalties for such offences amaze those who have formed
their conception of the relation of a state to even its offending citizens from the practice of the
American commonwealths [and this punishment] has no fellow in American legislation.”).
275. Id. at 378 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN
UNION 329-30 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1868)).
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This is an interesting passage. Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations
describes desuetude in a relatively limited sense. If a practice like
the whipping post or the pillory was never part of the usage of a
jurisdiction, or fell out of usage prior to the adoption of the jurisdic-
tion’s cruel and unusual punishments clause, such a practice might
be forbidden because it is “unusual,” that is, not part of the jurisdic-
tion’s legal usage.276
The Weems court, on the other hand, referred to desuetude in its
fullest sense. Just as the James court held that desuetude permitted
the development of the law through the “silent and gradual disuse
of barbarous criminal punishments,”277 the Weems court stated that
desuetude may inform our sense of what is cruel and unusual.278
The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is “not fastened to the
obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes
enlightened by a humane justice.”279 When a once traditional
punishment falls out of usage long enough to demonstrate a stable,
multigenerational consensus against the punishment, the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause may be interpreted to recognize this
change in societal standards.280 In this sense, the Clause may be
considered “progressive.”281 Thus, the Weems court was able to
conclude that even if a punishment like that inflicted on Weems
would once have been considered acceptable in the American
criminal justice system, it was no longer acceptable.282
276. See id.
277. James v. Commonwealth, 12 Serg. & Rawle 220, 228 (Pa. 1825).
278. Weems, 217 U.S. at 378.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. The dissent in Weems adopted a remarkably Scalia-like approach to the original
meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, arguing that if a punishment was
constitutional at the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted, it could never be considered
cruel and unusual. See id. at 409-10 (White, J., dissenting) (asserting that “cruel” meant the
imposition of “unnecessary bodily suffering through a resort to inhuman methods for causing
bodily torture, like or which are of the nature of the cruel methods of bodily torture which had
been made use of prior to the bill of rights of 1689” and “unusual” meant judicial imposition
of non-customary punishments unauthorized by statute).
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4. Denationalization and Evolving Standards of Decency: The
Death of Desuetude in the Supreme Court of the United States
The Supreme Court turned decisively away from desuetude in
Trop v. Dulles.283 In Trop, the petitioner was stripped of his
American citizenship after being convicted of wartime desertion
from the military.284 This punishment was inflicted under a statute
enacted in 1940285 that was designed to update a Civil War Era
statute depriving deserters of the “rights of citizenship.”286 A
plurality of the Court invalidated the statute on the ground that it
was contrary to the “evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.”287 In making this determination, the
Court did not examine whether the punishment was “contrary to
long usage;” nor did it ask whether the punishment had fallen out
of usage during the century between the Civil War and the imposi-
tion of this punishment on Trop.288 Instead, the plurality simply
concluded that denationalization was an unacceptable punishment
under the plurality’s own moral judgment.289 The plurality’s moral
judgment was bolstered by the fact that denationalization was not
imposed as punishment in most “civilized nations,”290 but otherwise
the plurality made no reference to any external sources for deter-
mining what current “standards of decency” require.291 In short, the
Trop plurality engaged in the abstract moral reasoning, unmediated
by tradition, and advocated by Dworkin, Perry, and other “living
originalists.”292
283. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
284. Id. at 87.
285. Id. at 88.
286. Id. at 89.
287. Id. at 101.
288. There was apparently some ambiguity as to whether the Civil War-era statute
actually deprived deserters of citizenship, or merely deprived them of certain rights of
citizenship, such as the right to vote. Id. at 89. If the 1940 statute went further than the civil
War statute by stripping deserters of citizenship itself, it was arguably new and therefore
“unusual.” The Trop plurality did not pursue this line of reasoning.
289. See id. at 101-02 (describing the consequences of denationalization that the Trop
plurality considered unacceptably cruel).
290. Id. at 102.
291. See id. at 101.
292. See supra Part I.B.3.
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The Supreme Court’s move in Trop represented a fundamental
break from its prior method of determining whether a punishment
is cruel and unusual. Instead of looking to prior practice to deter-
mine whether there is a stable, multigenerational societal consensus
against a given punishment, the Court would henceforth try to
decide whether the punishment meets the standards of today.293
This new approach has lacked the reliability and stability that come
from a focus on long usage or long nonusage.294 It has also created
ambiguity as to whether the Supreme Court should rely on its own
moral judgment or look for evidence of some kind of current “societal
consensus” against the punishment.295 As one commentator
observed, the result has been a “train wreck.”296 Although the
Supreme Court has limited the application of the death penalty in
some circumstances,297 and has made it more difficult to impose life
sentences with no possibility of parole on juveniles,298 its reasoning
in these cases has ranged from implausible to indefensible.299 Even
worse, the Supreme Court has abandoned constitutional review of
293. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
294. For example, in Stanford v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that it did not violate
the Constitution to execute sixteen- or seventeen-year-old murderers. 492 U.S. 361, 380
(1989). Sixteen years later, the Court ruled in Roper v. Simmons, that such executions did
violate the Constitution. 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). Similarly, the Court held in Penry v.
Lynaugh that execution of the mentally retarded did not violate the Constitution. 492 U.S.
302, 340 (1989). Thirteen years later, in Atkins v. Virginia, the Court held that such
executions were unconstitutional. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). Neither the Roper court nor the
Atkins court held that the prior cases were wrongly decided. Rather, they determined that a
far from overpowering trend toward abolition among the states showed that such
punishments no longer comported with current standards of decency. See Roper, 543 U.S. at
565 (noting a five state trend toward abolition of the death penalty for minors since Stanford
was decided in 1989); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-16 (noting a sixteen state trend toward abolition
of the death penalty for the mentally disabled since Penry was decided in 1987). These
decisions led Justice Scalia to exclaim in exasperation that Atkins and Roper were based on
the proposition “that the meaning of our Constitution has changed over the past 15
years—not, mind you, that this Court’s decision 15 years ago was wrong, but that the
Constitution has changed.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 608 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
295. See supra notes 101-102.
296. Benjamin Wittes, What Is “Cruel and Unusual”?, 134 POL’Y REV. 15, 15-16 (2005).
297. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 431-34 (2008); Roper, 543 U.S. at 566-68;
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-19; Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982); Coker v. Georgia,
433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977).
298. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48,
82 (2010). 
299. See Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 8, at 910-26; Stinneford, The
Original Meaning of Unusual, supra note 8, at 1747-57.
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prison sentences, leaving 99.999% of felony offenders beyond the
protection of the Cruel and Uusual Punishments Clause.300 The
Supreme Court’s half-century-old experiment with evolving stan-
dards of decency has not been a happy one.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF DESUETUDE AS A CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD
This Part of the Article will briefly examine the standards of
adjudication implied by the original meaning of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, and will describe the benefits and
detriments associated with this approach to interpretation. Finally,
it will assess what this approach tells us about the constitutionality
of the death penalty at the federal and state levels.
A. Standards of Adjudication
The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause asks the Supreme
Court to determine whether a given punishment practice is cruel in
light of long usage. The Clause does not prohibit punishments that
are “cruel and rare,” but those that are “cruel and new.”301 A
punishment is “new” if it has never been imposed before or if it is
revived after having fallen out of usage long ago.302
The original meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause implies that the main focus of the Supreme Court’s inquiry
should be objective and straightforward. If a petitioner challenges
a given method of punishment—like the firing squad in Wilker-
son—the Court should first ask whether the punishment is
“usual.”303 That is, it should ask whether the punishment has
continuously been used in the jurisdiction for a long time.304 Similar-
ly, if a petitioner challenges a given punishment as excessive—like
the imposition of “cadena temporal” for a strict liability false
300. See Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 8, at 902-03 (arguing that the
Supreme Court has restricted proportionality review to such an extent that “[l]ess than one
one-thousandth of one percent of all felony offenders are better off than they would have been
had the Supreme Court never engaged in proportionality review”).
301. See generally Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 8; Stinneford, The
Original Meaning of Unusual, supra note 8.
302. See supra Part II.C.
303. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
304. See Stinneford, The Original Meaning of Unusual, supra note 8, at 1816.
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statement crime in Weems—the Court should ask whether punish-
ments like this one have customarily been imposed for crimes like
this one.305
If the punishment is “usual,” this ends the inquiry; the punish-
ment is constitutional. But if the punishment is new, then the Court
must compare it with the punishment practices that have prevailed
until now. If it is significantly harsher than those practices, it is
cruel and unusual.
B. Benefits of This Approach
This standard for determining whether a punishment is cruel and
unusual possesses the main strengths of both Scalia-style
originalism and living originalism, with none of their principal
weaknesses. Although the test for determining whether a punish-
ment is cruel and unusual is not as “cut and dried”306 as Justice
Scalia’s bright-line rules, it is still relatively determinate. Judges
are capable of determining objectively whether a practice is new.
They are also capable of determining the harshness of a new
punishment in relation to the traditional practices it replaces. This
inquiry involves an exercise of judgment, but it is judgment directed
at an objective fact. The results of cases decided under this standard
will be much more reliable and predictable than under the current
“evolving standards of decency” approach.
This standard is also sensitive to cultural change in a way that
Justice Scalia’s approach is not. If a once traditional practice falls
out of usage and remains out of usage for a long time, this is power-
ful evidence that there is a stable, multigenerational consensus
against it.307 When a punishment has been rejected for multiple gen-
erations, we may appropriately say that it is no longer part of our
legal tradition, and thus no longer “usual.”308 Accordingly, we are
not led into the untenable position of having to approve of once tra-
ditional punishments like branding, flogging, or bodily mutilation.
305. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 349 (1910); Stinneford, Rethinking
Proportionality, supra note 8, at 968-72.
306. Scalia, supra note 41, at 45.
307. See supra Part II.B-C.
308. See supra Part II.C.
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Like the living originalist approach, this standard recognizes that
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is consistent with an
implicit natural law conception.309 It is directed at those punish-
ments that are “in fact cruel and unusual,”310 not just those that
were considered cruel at a particular moment in time. At the same
time, this standard respects principles of entrenchment, popular
sovereignty, and the rule of law in a way that the living originalist
approach does not.311 Under the original meaning of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, it is not the job of judges to invali-
date traditional punishments that are still being used. Rather, such
punishments may fall out of usage because they are rejected over a
long period of time by some combination of the legislative branch,
through statutory amendment to abolish the punishment; the
executive branch, through charging decisions and sentencing
recommendations; the judicial branch, through decisions about the
appropriate sentence in individual cases; and the people themselves,
through jury decisions about the appropriate sentence in individual
cases. Only if a consensus of these groups—all of which represent
“the people” directly or indirectly—holds for a period of several
generations will the scope and application of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause change.312
This means that judges lack the power to change the scope of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Only the people have this
power, and such change can only happen if the people concur over
a period of several generations. An entrenched constitutional right
cannot be swept away or marginalized in the face of a public panic.
309. Common law thinkers universally held that common law rights, like the right not to
be subjected to cruel and unusual punishments, have their ultimate foundation in natural
law. For example, Edward Coke asserted that the “Law of Nature is part of the Law of
England.” COKE, Calvin’s Case, or the Case of the Postnati, in 1 THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND
SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE, supra note 145, at 166, 195. Coke also asserted that “nothing
that is contrarie to reason, is consonant to Law,” and that “reason is the life of the Law, nay
the common Law it selfe is nothing else but reason.” COKE, supra note 148, at 684, 701.
310. Dworkin, supra note 6, at 120.
311. See supra Part I.B.5.
312. See supra Part II.C.
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C. Detriments of This Approach
The main weakness of this approach, in contrast to living
originalism, is that it slows down constitutional change and does not
allow judges to drive such change.313 Only after social movements
have changed the societal consensus, and such consensus has been
entrenched for several generations, can judges appropriately
recognize such change in constitutional adjudication.314 The judicial
role is not to lead the change, but to recognize it after it has been
firmly established.
But this weakness may not be a weakness after all if we care
about reliability, entrenchment, and popular sovereignty. Remem-
ber what Sir John Davies and numerous other thinkers said about
the common law: It is normatively superior to edicts and legislative
enactments because it only becomes law after long usage has
already shown it to be “fit and agreeable to the nature & disposition
of the people.”315 If the scope of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause, or any other constitutional provision, can be changed
through mere judicial edict, the results are not at all certain to be
“fit and agreeable” to American society.
D. The Constitutionality of the Death Penalty
This final Subpart will be short because its conclusion is obvious.
The death penalty is not an unconstitutional method of punishment
at this point in time because it is a traditional punishment that has
never fallen out of usage.316 The death penalty is, however, an
unconstitutionally excessive punishment for once capital crimes like
theft. Because the practice of imposing the death penalty for
relatively minor crimes fell out of usage long ago, it is now clearly
313. See supra Part I.B.4.
314. See supra Part II.B.2.
315. See DAVIES, supra note 147.
316. According to the Death Penalty Information Center, thirty-two states authorize
imposition of the death penalty. See States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty
[http://perma.cc/52DJ-DJWR]. Although there have been movements to abolish the death
penalty from the very beginning of the Republic, the death penalty has continuously been
imposed throughout American history, with the exception of the brief hiatus between Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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desuete. The constitutionality of the death penalty for more serious
nonhomicide offenses, like aggravated rape of a child, is a closer
question. At the time the Supreme Court ruled in Kennedy v.
Louisiana that it was cruel and unusual to impose the death penalty
for a nonhomicide offense against an individual, there had not been
an execution for a nonhomicide offense in America for forty-four
years.317 Given this long gap in time, it could be argued that the
practice had become desuete. 
There are, however, two reasons to doubt this conclusion. First,
this gap appears to have resulted at least partly from the Supreme
Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia to strike down all American
death penalty statutes,318 and its decision in Coker v. Georgia to
strike down the death penalty for simple rape.319 If legislatures
refrained for several decades from enacting statutes authorizing the
death penalty for crimes like aggravated rape of a child out of a fear
that the Supreme Court would strike such statutes down, such fear
would not necessarily be sufficient to show a stable, multigen-
erational societal consensus against the punishment.
Second, it is unclear that forty-four years of disuse would be
sufficient to establish that a punishment has become “unusual,”
even under less ambiguous circumstances than those we see here.
Constitutional desuetude arguably requires a longer period of disuse
than pure common law desuetude because the two doctrines differ
in their effect. If a court finds a statute desuete without finding it
unconstitutional, the legislature has the option to reenact the
statute and bring it back to life.320 But if a court finds a punishment
cruel and unusual under the doctrine of constitutional desuetude,
such punishment cannot be revived without constitutional amend-
ment. 
If the Supreme Court concludes that a punishment has become
constitutionally desuete before it has fallen out of usage for a
sufficient period of time, there is a good chance that the Court will
incorrectly conclude that there is a stable multigenerational
consensus against the punishment. Perhaps for this reason, the
Supreme Court seems to have employed constitutional desuetude
317. See 554 U.S. 407, 431-34 (2008).
318. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 238-40.
319. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977).
320. See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 161, at 592. 
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only when a punishment has not been used for close to a century or
more.321 The most notable exception to this rule came in Furman v.
Georgia, in which the Supreme Court struck down all American
death penalty statutes.322 Several of the concurring Justices based
their decisions, in part, on the belief that the death penalty was in
the process of becoming desuete.323 Because they considered the
death penalty essentially desuete, several Justices expressed the
belief that legislatures would not reenact death penalty statutes
after Furman.324 
The Justices’ belief that America had developed a stable consen-
sus against the death penalty turned out to be incorrect as demon-
strated by the fact that thirty-five states reenacted death penalty
statutes in the immediate wake of Furman.325 Ironically, the
Supreme Court’s decision in Furman to strike down all American
death penalty statutes may have delayed or prevented the develop-
ment of any consensus against the death penalty, because the
perception of improper judicial activism in Furman seems to have
dramatically increased support for this punishment. As Corinna
Barrett Lain described, public support for the death penalty was at
or below 50 percent in the years leading up to 1972, the year
Furman was decided.326 Within months after Furman, public
support for the death penalty increased to 57 percent, and reached
66 percent by 1976.327 The reaction to Furman demonstrates the
danger of finding a practice desuete before it has fallen out of usage
long enough to demonstrate a stable, multigenerational consensus
321. See cases cited supra Part II.C.
322. 408 U.S. at 238.
323. See, e.g., id. at 300 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“When an unusually severe punishment
is authorized for wide-scale application but not, because of society’s refusal, inflicted save in
a few instances .... the likelihood is great that the punishment is tolerated only because of its
disuse.”); id. at 313 (White, J., concurring) (“[C]apital punishment ... has for all practical
purposes run its course.”).
324. See, e.g., THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985) 619 (Del Dickson ed., 2001)
(describing Justice Stewart’s opinion that the death penalty “was finished” after Furman);
BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 219 (1979) (ascribing to Chief Justice
Burger the claim that “[t]here will never be another execution in this country”).
325. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976); Corinna Barrett Lain, Furman
Fundamentals, 82 WASH. L. REV. 1, 46-55 (2007) (describing the widespread backlash against
Furman).
326. See Lain, supra note 325, at 36.
327. See id. at 49.
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against it. If the Supreme Court declares a punishment desuete
before it has suffered long disuse, there is a good chance that the
Court will misread societal attitudes toward the punishment. Such
intervention may even provoke a backlash that revives a punish-
ment that had previously been on the way out.
Finally, the death penalty might be cruel and unusual under
several states’ constitutions. Eighteen states and the District of
Columbia have abolished the death penalty.328 Four of these states
(Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin) abolished this
punishment over a century ago.329 Another five (Alaska, Hawaii,
Iowa, Vermont, and West Virginia) abolished the death penalty
around fifty years ago.330 A strong argument could be made that this
punishment is now cruel and unusual in these states, particularly
those whose consensus against the punishment has lasted more
than a century. Should a legislature seek to revive the death penalty
in one of these states, a court may appropriately invalidate it on
state constitutional grounds.
CONCLUSION
The death penalty could be declared unconstitutional consistent
with the original meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause—but not yet. If it were to fall out of usage long enough to
demonstrate a stable, multigenerational consensus against it, the
Supreme Court could appropriately recognize it as cruel and
unusual. This state of affairs has already occurred with respect to
certain crimes, such as the death penalty for theft, and under the
constitutions of certain states. But it is not yet an entirely imper-
missible punishment under the United States Constitution. All of
this suggests that anti-death penalty advocates should focus their
efforts on abolition through the political process. Once they succeed,
the desuetude clock will start ticking.
328. See States With and Without the Death Penalty, supra note 316.
329. See id.
330. See id.
